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THE CHAIRMAN : Delegate Hanson.
DELEGATE HANSON: Insofar as that
is within the definition of general public
law and all of section 7.06, that would be
the case, as I responded in my answer to
Delegate Gallagher.
THE CHAIRMAN : I am afraid that an-
swer confuses the Chair even more.
If you are referring here to a law of the
General Assembly which would authorize
but not compel a county to take specific
action with respect to elections, I would
take it that you do not intend that such
law, without the option having been exer-
cised by the county, would be effective un-
der this sentence.
Am I correct about that?
DELEGATE HANSON: You are cor-
rect, Mr. Chairman. The law would not be
self-executing.
THE CHAIRMAN: Then I think your
answer should have been as the Chair indi-
cated earlier. Your "public general law"
would then not refer to the kind of law
which would authorize a particular county
to take action.
Delegate Hanson?
DELEGATE HANSON: I do not know
whether you are making me sound clearer
or I am making me sound clearer, Mr.
Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: I am interested only
in understanding the impact of the sen-
tence. As the Chair reads the sentence as
presently drafted, the sentence beginning
in line 10, you are providing that elections
of county officials shall be held at the same
time as election of State officials, unless a
public general law says otherwise, or un-
less the instrument of government says
otherwise.
Now, with respect to the first "unless",
I take it you would not include in that
category a law which authorized a county
to provide otherwise if the county had not
provided otherwise.
Delegate Hanson: I believe that is cor-
rect, but I am now confused myself.
I yield on this to Delegate Moser, Mr.
Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Moser.
DELEGATE MOSER: I must claim re-
sponsibility for the Chairman's confusion.
It is perfectly clear, I think from earlier
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colloquy, that what the sponsors intend is
that when the term "public general law"
is used here that it carries with it the full
meaning of 7.06.
I can get into a technical discussion of
it, but possibly it is better not to, because
Style and Drafting is working on this spe-
cific problem. The intention is that the
General Assembly will be authorized, if it
denies the power to select its particular
election date to all counties, to neverthe-
less permit some counties to select their
own election date.
Is that clear?
THE CHAIRMAN: But if that is done,
I take it that the first clause in the sen-
tence beginning in line 10 does not become
operative. It is not the kind of public gen-
eral law that thereby is in effect, and that
it would not become operative unless the
county, pursuant to the law, took action.
DELEGATE MOSER: That is precisely
true.
THE CHAIRMAN : Then I would take it
that it would necessarily follow that the
term "public general law" as used in this
sentence, could not possibly embrace the
kind of law which authorizes a county to
take action.
DELEGATE MOSER: Mr. Chairman,
that is not what the sponsors intend in this
respect, and I guess we will have to get
into the technical discussion.
THE CHAIRMAN: I am afraid that we
are confusing the issue worse if we get
into the technical discussion. I suggest to
you that the question of intent here does
not depend upon that, but depends entirely
upon what is intended as a matter of fact.
Now, let me ask the sponsor of this ques-
tion, without relation to the language. I
take it that the sponsors intend by this
section that elections of county officials
shall be held at the same time as the elec-
tion for state officials, even though the
General Assembly passes a law authorizing
Baltimore City to provide otherwise if in
fact Baltimore City does not provide other-
wise.
Is that correct, sir?
DELEGATE HANSON: Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair is either
very abstruse, or I stand on my previous
statement.
Delegate Clagett.
DELEGATE CLAGETT: All that we
need to understand, Mr. Chairman, is that
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