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then have the subsequent opportunity to
override that veto by a three-fifths ma-
jority of all of the members elected to the
General Assembly.
This is the kind of recommendation
which has been made countless times by
students of state government and students
of budgetary process, that the General
Assembly should be free to increase or de-
crease within the balanced budget, but that
this should in turn be checked and balanced
by a governor with the power to reduce or
strike out such an item.
What we have in Maryland is the British
system of budgeting without the advan-
tages thereof. In Britain the government
falls if the budget is increased. We do not
have such a situation in this country, and
there the government, of course, is a part
of the Parliament itself.
In this country, in a system of divided
powers, we have the process in many states
which I am discussing and describing hero
this afternoon. The problem, then, is to
permit the legislature to participate fully
in the establishment of the priorities of the
State, to achieve the objectives that were
suggested by the Goodnow Commission in
1916 to give the governor the executive
budget and the sole responsibility to sub-
mit that budget to the legislature; that
the legislature, in the second principle of
that report, should not change the budget
so as to incur a deficit; that the legislature
may provide for programs not included in
the governor's estimate. This in the Good-
now Report was proposed to be done in two
ways, either by the supplemental appropri-
ation which was adopted in 1916 or by an
increase voted by three-fifths of the mem-
bers of the General Assembly, and provid-
ing the revenues in the act for the new
appropriation.
I submit that we can achieve these same
objectives in the framework of 1967 and
beyond that date rather than in the frame-
work of 1916 up to the present date. I
urge you to support this amendment, be-
cause I believe that we have created in
this State now by the actions of this Com-
mittee a very strong governor who does not
have the check within the administration
of the comptroller, who has full power to
make the estimate of revenues, who has
full powers to establish the executive
budget, and who will have in addition to
this full power under the new executive
article to exercise firm and strong ad-
ministrative and budgetary discipline over
his department heads.
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This is a powerful officer, and we need to
provide a suitable legislative check to that
officer.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Sherbow.
DELEGATE SHERBOW: Mr. Chairman
and ladies and gentlemen of the Committee,
I do not know of any matter that is going
to come before you or that has come before
you that is as important as that which
faces you now. I urge you to turn down
this amendment. This amendment would
literally destroy the budget system as we
know it in Maryland, and as it has worked
for a half-century, giving us sound gov-
ernment.
I am rather intrigued at the fact that
this amendment is presented at this time
in this fashion. There were no persons,
committees, or recommendations appearing
before our Committee urging what is called
for in this amendment except the two or
three members of the Committee who were
from the legislature who discussed it.
We have had nothing in public hearings
urging that we strike the guts out of the
system we now have and put in its place
what would be the greatest opportunity
for log-rolling in the General Assembly
that man could conceive.
Let me tell you how this operates. The
budget is a long, detailed document sub-
mitted by the governor. When the budget
is passed, it is in and of itself a law. If
another law is being considered, you get an
opportunity to be heard. If it passes and
goes into the other house, you know it is
that particular law. You know that this is
the bill that you want to follow, either to
pass or to keep from passing.
But what is going to happen when there
is presented not what the governor recom-
mends, but an item to change — let me
pick this one out: all of the appropria-
tions for the University of Maryland —
and turn them over to the five colleges; or
take the reverse, taking everything out of
the five colleges and giving that to the
University of Maryland.
You may or may not be able to follow
that kind of detail. This is the way in
which you can destroy the whole system of
government as it has been built up. The
legislature has tremendous power. We have
had a balanced budget. This kind of sug-
gestion was made to the Sobeloff Commis-
sion. They listened. They said no.
The kind of recommendation for a budget
system that we have in Maryland is the
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