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mind indicates that the State grant per-
mission to hold a lottery, whereas your lan-
guage says no lotteries shall be sanctioned.
That could be read by some minds to
encompass a broader scope, that any type
of lottery in the State whether held by a
private group or religious group or any
other kind would be barred by your lan-
guage, whereas the reading of the present
Constitution at least in one case, would in-
dicate it refers to an actual grant of per-
mission to hold a lottery.
Is there any intention to broaden the
definition?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Sherbow?
DELEGATE SHERBOW: Delegate
Scanlan, all that we attempt to do is to
adopt what the present Maryland law is,
but the point you raise was covered by an
opinion of Attorney General Herbert R.
O'Conor in 1935, where he held that the
present constitutional prohibition against
lottery prohibits a state lottery. That
means that the lottery could not be author-
ized by giving authority to do so to some
group as they did in the old days; it also
means the state could not operate its own
lottery. What we are attempting to do is to
encompass the situation as it exists today.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: Then your an-
swer is, Judge Sherbow, that you are not
trying to broaden the scope of the pro-
hibition?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Sherbow.
DELEGATE SHERBOW: Not at all,
except that we do want to make sure that
the language shall not authorize a grant,
and that it also prevent the State itself
from engaging in a lottery.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: You confuse
me there, Judge Sherbow. It prohibits the
State itself from engaging in a lottery and
it prohibits the State itself from authoriz-
ing a lottery to be conducted by private
people?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Sherbow.
DELEGATE SHERBOW: That's right.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: There is no
change in the interpretation?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Sherbow.
DELEGATE SHERBOW: None what-
ever.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: I have another
question.
You are aware of a case that has been
argued in the Court of Appeals where a
point has been raised that the present pro-
hibition against lottery prohibits Anne
Arundel County from authorizing bingo
within the county.
Should the Court of Appeals agree with
that contention, is it the intention of the
language proposed by your Committee that
bingo conducted by private groups under a
specific authorization of a county such as
Anne Arundel would be barred by the pro-
hibition that you now lay before the Gen-
eral Assembly?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Sherbow.
DELEGATE SHERBOW: No, actually
they operate here by reason of a state
statute, which took bingo, as I understand
it, out of any prohibition. What happens
after that, I don't know. Judge Evans was
correct in the lower court. If the Court of
Appeals should hold that bingo is a lottery,
our view is that it is not to be prohibited
under the terms of the twelve words that
we are using.
In other words, bingo is not to lie pre-
vented from operating if our restraint re-
mains in the Constitution and, assuming,
of course, that the legislature permits it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Scanlan, do
you have a further question?
DELEGATE SCANLAN: I do, Mr.
Chairman.
Did your Committee give any thought to
attempting to define lottery?
DELEGATE SHERBOW: No, we felt
that it has obtained in Maryland whatever
was needed, by reason of a series of at-
torney general opinions, and that if we
were to attempt to define it, by that very
effort, we would find that outside of the
language that was used would be the loop-
holes by which it could be operated.
We are accepting the meaning as it is
now generally understood.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: If, though, the
Court of Appeals should define bingo to
fall within the definition of lottery, am I
clear in my understanding that your propo-
sition would not go that far? That you
would agree with the lower court's decision
in the case to which we both referred?
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