create or abolish, principal departments or
administrative units of the executive
branch. Hence it is recognized that the Gen-
eral Assembly and governor are given co-
extensive power to determine how the ex-
ecutive branch will be organizationally
structured to implement these programs.
This section provides that if the gover-
nor's plan for reorganizing the executive
branch affects existing law as the Commit-
tee feels it almost invariably will, that it
should be set forth in an executive order
and submitted to the General Assembly
within the first ten days of a regular ses-
sion. It then takes effect as law unless spe-
cifically disapproved by a majority of all
members of either house of the General As-
sembly within fifty days.
Similar provisions for reorganization are
incorporated in the Alaska Constitution and
have been authorized by statute in the na-
tional government, and in the States of
Michigan, Pennsylvania and South Caro-
lina.
Section 4.20 describes in general terms
how the principal departments of the ex-
ecutive branch, established in Section 4.18,
are to be managed. The first sentence re-
quires the heads of principal departments
be single executives unless otherwise pro-
vided by law. The Committee accepts the
principle of public administration that it is
undesirable to have a board administering
an executive department.
At the same time, the Committee recog-
nizes that there are few administrative
"absolutes" and that sometimes a plural
decision-making body may be desirable
when there is a need for continuity in policy
or to represent diverse viewpoints. This
section therefore permits the General As-
sembly to create boards or commissions as
heads of principal departments.
The second sentence assures that each
board or commission which does serve as
the head of a principal department will
have an officer to handle the administra-
tive work of the department.
Section 4.21: the Constitution guaran-
tees to the governor certain appointive
powers. It provides that he shall with the
advice and consent of the Senate appoint
the single executives and fill vacancies on
boards and commissions serving as heads
of principal departments and also, with the
members of regulatory and quasi-judicial
agencies. The Committee feels that if the
governor is to be chief executive of the
state he must be able to appoint those
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officials who are responsible for executing
the administration's programs and policies.
At the same time, the Committee feels
that senatorial confirmation should be re-
quired as a traditional legislative check on
the executive's power.
This section also provides that the gov-
ernor acting alone can appoint those serv-
ing as chief administrative officers under
boards or commissions which head principal
departments. It is felt that senatorial con-
firmation is not necessary in this case be-
cause these administrators do not make
policy.
An exception is made, however, in the
case of the head or chief administrative
officer of an institution of higher learning
or of the state public school system.
The Committee recognizes that public
education occupies a unique position among
the services rendered by the State. There-
fbre, to insulate public education from the
risk of political influence, the method of
appointing and removing these administra-
tive officers is left to the law-making proc-
ess.
The last sentence of this section permits
the General Assembly to establish occupa-
tional qualifications that these appointees
must meet. For example, the General As-
sembly might require that the head of the
state's legal department be a lawyer ad-
mitted to the bar for at least five years or
that the head of the state's fiscal depart-
ment be a certified public accountant.
Section 4.22 is a companion piece to Sec-
tion 4.21. It guarantees to the governor the
power to remove single executives serving
as heads of principal departments and
chief administrative officers. The Commit-
tee feels that this removal power is essen-
tial if these officials are in fact going to be
responsive to the governor. In other words,
these appointees serve at the pleasure of
the governor.
While recognizing that there is some
danger that the governor may abuse this
power, the Committee feels that there are
sufficient safeguards.
First, there is the Maryland tradition
against the wholesale removal of depart-
ment heads. Second, there are the require-
ments of section 4.21 which require that
any replacement that the governor proposes
must be confirmed by the Senate and have
those occupational qualifications required
by law.
The Committee recognizes that the need
for continuity is one justification for policy
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