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DELEGATE MUDD: Yes, Mr. Chair-
man.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate L. Taylor.
DELEGATE L. TAYLOR: I am con-
cerned about the usage of the words "rights
and privileges" in line 16 on page 8. Why
do you use the words "rights and priv-
ileges" flowing from his judicial service?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mudd.
DELEGATE MUDD: It only has refer-
ence to his retirement benefits, as I in-
terpret it, Delegate Taylor.
THE CHAIRMAN: The answer to your
question, as I understand it, Delegate Tay-
lor, is that that is the Committee's way
of saying "pension."
DELEGATE L. TAYLOR: What I am
trying to find out is if the judge has cer-
tain rights to retirement benefits, then the
rights are circumscribed by the fact that
it says "only as prescribed by removal."
THE CHAIRMAN: What is your
question?
DELEGATE L. TAYLOR: Is this a
right? Is this really a right?
DELEGATE MUDD: In answer to your
question, Delegate Taylor, it seems to me
that a judge's entitlement to retirement
upon leaving the bench is a right, and a
privilege. Now if he is removed for cause,
then what we are saying, that those rights
and privileges shall thereafter be as the
court decides they are warranted under the
circumstances. They may be reduced or
eliminated completely in the case of a
judge removed for cause.
THE CHAIRMAN: Do you have a fur-
ther question?
DELEGATE L. TAYLOR: My question
is directed to a clause in the committee
recommendation. If you determine to re-
move the judges from retirement without
a pension, you are really causing him a
economic hardship, and this would be vio-
lating the rights we have stipulated in the
Personal Rights section.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mudd.
DELEGATE MUDD: I would say it is
the sense of the Committee that a judge
who was removed for cause warranted for-
feiture of some of the rights and privileges
possible under his retirement.
DELEGATE L. TAYLOR: Does he have
a right to the benefits of his labor? The
pension deducted from his salary?
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THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mudd.
DELEGATE MUDD: No. The judicial
pension is contributed entirely by the State,
with no restive right from contributions by
the judge.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Pullen.
DELEGATE PULLEN: May I ask Del-
egate Mudd a question?
THE CHAIRMAN: Does Delegate Mudd
yield to a question?
DELEGATE MUDD: Yes, Mr. Chair-
man.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Pullen.
DELEGATE PULLEN: I would feel a
little easier if you would define "cause."
For several years I was Chairman of the
State Teachers Retirement System, and
this situation came before us on several
occasions.
THE CHAIRMAN: What word do you
refer to, Delegate Pullen?
DELEGATE PULLEN: The word
"cause."
THE CHAIRMAN: Where?
DELEGATE PULLEN: In other words,
does it mean a criminal act?
THE CHAIRMAN: The word "cause"
where?
DELEGATE PULLEN: C-a-u-s-e.
THE CHAIRMAN: Where in the sec-
tion is the word to which you refer?
DELEGATE PULLEN: I am referring
to where it relates to "spouse." I am trying
to get the right title. Delegate Mudd, you
stated if a man or judge were removed for
cause, that there was a possibility that his
pension rights might be eliminated. Now,
the question that I have is this: What are
those causes? For instance, a man might
become sick and commit a criminal act and
lose his pension. Now, I would feel a little
easier if his rights were protected by a
better definition.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mudd.
DELEGATE MUDD: When I use the
word "cause," Dr. Pullen, in my explana-
tion, it is not a word that is in this section;
but I used "cause" as a descriptive of the
three facets of conduct, namely, misconduct
while in an office, persistent failure to per-
form the duties of his office, or conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of
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