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provides a technique through which the General Assembly
can call itself into session, so the General Assembly
could call itself back into session for the purpose of
reconsidering vetoed bills if it wanted to. If it thought
it wasn't worth it and could let a bill die with the veto
they wouldn't call it back into session.
For example, if the attorney general had ruled
a bill unconstitutional, there really is no need for the
General Assembly to be calling itself back into session
to reconsider those bills since. I am sure the General
Assembly would feel bound by the attorney general's
opinion on the Constitutionality of the bill and that is
where we leave it to the discretion of the General Assembly
as to whether or not to call itself back in session to
reconsider vetoed bills.
differs
This section/from Article 2, Section 17 of the
present Constitution in that it does not require bills
vetoed by the governor after adjournment be returned to
the next regular session of the General Assembly.
The legislators who testified before the
committee indicated that this procedure was cumbersome. |