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Delegate Boyce?
DELEGATE BOYCE: Mr. Chairman, I
think it should be pointed out, so that the
problem will be solved later on, if we vote
for this amendment, and I hope we do, we
are then going to have to drop some words
from 4.21 and 4.22, which reads, "acting
as heads of principal departments", be-
cause they will have to be out of there. I
think then we can get a clear-cut vote on
this issue, which I thought was reasonably
clear-cut yesterday but apparently quite a
few people do not think so. So let's try it
again, and I hope we will vote favorably
on it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate James.
DELEGATE JAMES: Just a word in
opposition.
It seems to me that we are precluding
some very progressive steps in Maryland
if we adopt this proposition.
One of the greatest assets of the State
of Maryland, of course, is the Chesapeake
Bay and its tributaries, and I think it
would be politically possible in all proba-
bility to consolidate our natural resources
administration under a Board of Natural
Resources, to give that board rule-making
power, and have a unified administration
of natural resources, including the Chesa-
peake Bay and its tributaries.
However, I cannot conceive of the legis-
lature in the foreseeable future ever vest-
ing this total power in one man, so that by
adopting this proposal you would effectively
preclude a type of administration of natu-
ral resources that would be politically
feasible and politically possible.
Another example is the State Roads
Commission. The State Roads Commission
has the power presently of what is known
as the quick take in condemnation cases,
but before this quick take can be exer-
cised, there must be a resolution of the
State Roads Commission, acting as a
board, to provide this power in a particular
instance where necessary.
The vesting of such power in one man
to exercise the power of quick take would
be very questionable. It is this type of
thing which would make it very question-
able to eliminate the power of the legis-
lature to create a board.
I would agree in principle that in most
instances a single executive should head a
department, but certainly, as Shakespeare
says, you cannot look into the seeds of time
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and say which grain will grow and which
grain will not.
You do not know exactly when a situa-
tion will develop when a board will be the
thing that public policy would dictate and
we do not want to preclude further action
in these instances which will surely occur.
THE CHAIRMAN: Does any other dele-
gate desire to speak in favor of the amend-
ment?
Delegate Boileau?
DELEGATE BOILEAU: Mr. Chairman,
fellow delegates, in 4.18 we have already
taken care of the areas which Delegate
James mentioned. The regulatory, quasi-
judicial and temporary agencies are the
kind of agencies that in most instances
should have boards, and 4.18 allows them
to have boards by allowing them to be set
up outside of the twenty principal depart-
ments.
The governor is the one elected official
who will be carrying out the administrative
duties, executive duties in the executive de-
partment. He is the only one that the
voters can actually get at.
In most cases if you allow for other than
single executives, if you allow for boards
or commissions for your principal depart-
ments, purely administrative departments
for carrying out purely administrative
functions, you will insulate them from the
people.
These boards will be set aside. The gov-
ernor does not have full control over them.
He should have. He is going to be held re-
sponsible for the execution of the laws in
this State.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Raley.
DELEGATE RALEY: Mr. Chairman,
members of the Committee of the Whole:
I would like briefly to speak against this
amendment.
I think it a very important question and
I think what the Executive Branch Com-
mittee has set out is good, and it is a bal-
anced thing, where it allows flexibility in
the case of whether there is to be a single
executive or a board.
I think that this flexibility is very good.
In fact, I also think here, and when you go
down to 4.21, that this amendment is actu-
ally cutting the executive power because
under section 4.21 the governor has the
power to appoint, without any advice and
consent, the administrative head of any
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