there will still arise a difficulty; that there
will be thrown upon communities the bur-
den of persons educated to habits of improvi-
dence, and that it may be necessary to pro-
vide for that. Now if the evil arises, it must
be provided for either by general law, or by
special legislation; or by provision made by
some of the authorities in the several counties,
which is the theory heretofore acted upon in
this State. And the question which this pro-
posed section designs to preseat to the con-
vention, as I understand it, is whether any
such paupers, if they be found to exist, shall
be maintained by general tax throughout
the State, or whether those of each county
shall be cared for by the county in which they
may be found.
Now, so far as I am concerned, I am not
willing that this question of the emancipation
of the slaves in this State shall stand upon
precisely the basis upon which gentlemen
were pleased to place it yesterday, it is not
the ground which has regulated my votes in
this convention, or which will regulate my
action hereafter. I am not here to interfere
with any vested right or to deprive any man
of any rights which he has heretofore main-
tained. And the question before us is not in
that attitude; or was not when we acted upon
the 'former article.
The question was this; here were 80,000
persons mutely looking to us, and pleading
their natural inborn rights. And here were
some 20,000 persons claiming certain legal
rights in contravention of those claimed nat-
ural rights. And to us, as judges, the ques-
tion was submitted whether the claimants of
those natural rights were entitled to the rights
which they claimed; or whether those claim-
ing rights under legislative enactment and law
should override those natural rights, and
maintain the hold which they claimed the
law had given them. And in saying that
slavery shall no longer exist in this State, we
have simply decided that the claim to liberty
as a natural right is a valid claim as against
those who claim the right to service, the right
to bone and muscle, as a legal enactment of
right. And in so deciding, we have not de-
prived any man of rights, any more than the
judge upon the bench, who is called upon to
adjudicate between two persons who come
before him, takes from them vested rights of
property which is theirs.
For example: here is a man who has held
a piece of real estate for twenty years. An-
other man brings an action of ejectment
against him, claiming that he has the para-
mount right to that property. And the judge
upon the bench decides that question. He
says whether this right which is claimed as
an adverse right is validly set up and over-
rides the other; or whether the occupant of
the property who claims it under color of law,
and has paid taxes upon it, and exercised all
the rights of ownership for years, shall main- |
tain his claim. That is not any taking of
private property for public use. It is simply
saying what is the right in the matter; what
is the natural or legal right when the two
claimants come in conflict. That is all we
have done.
Then the next question arises; shall the
person against whom the decision is thus
made, have the right, because your laws have
stood as they have, to claim from the State
itself, the judge in the case, compensation for
the property he has lost under the cause
which has been decided? I know of no pre-
cedent, no principle, no practice, no right to
any such claim.
We then come to the question now before
us. That is—What provision shall be made
for persons who have all their lifetime been
in bondage, and who now become free at a
period of life when they are not able to take
care of themselves? And this raises another
question. Upon this point we have had no
precedent in the form in which it is now pre-
sented. Heretofore in this State, the master
who voluntarily manumitted his slave after he
arrived at a certain age, was compelled to
make provision for his maintenance, so that
the public might be relieved of the burden.
But now that the State intervenes, and there
are persons who it is apprehended may not
be able to take care of themselves, the question
is—shall those who have heretofore exercised
rights over those persons, who have had the
benefit of their labor while they were able to
labor—shall they maintain, or shall they be
thrown as a public burden upon the State?
I know of no sanctity in this now abrogated
and abjured relation which gives the right in
this respect to claim exemption from the ordi-
nary rule which prevails in other places.
It is true, in no other State of our Union
has there been emancipation upon any such
scale as proposed here. And I find no provis-
ion in the law of any State but one upon this
subject; the State of Connecticut. In that
State it was enacted that—
"All persons until this time held as slaves,
and all persons heretofore slaves, who have
been emancipated by their masters, shall, if
they are reduced to want, be supported by
their former masters, their heirs, executors
and administrators, and, on their refusal, the
selectmen of the town where such persons be-
long shall provide for their support; and
such town may recover the expense of such
support, from such masters, or their heirs,
executors or administrators, by an action in
the case: provided, that nothing herein con-
tained shall apply to cases where masters,
emancipating their slaves, have been hereto-
fore exempted by law from liability for their
support," Stat. of Conn. Compilation of
1854, page 797.
That was the course which was taken in
that State. And what right, what sanctity,
was there ever in the existence of slavery in |
