way provided in this fundamental law. They
can do it at any time. Therefore, so far as
the argument against the propriety of limit
ing this power is concerned, that argument is
entitled to no serious consideration,
Another objection is, that this section con
flicts with the provision declaring that private
property shall not be taken for public use
without compensation. No one questions that
principle. But the question is this: is the
refusal on the part of the people of Maryland
to pay for negroes emancipated, a taking of
private property for public use? I say it is
not. The law is this: Not only that there
must be a taking of private property, but
there must also be an appropriation of that
property to public use, before there can be
any remuneration claimed. The bare taking
and the destruction of property by the pub-
lic does not bring it within that provision
of the constitution. The bare destruction
of private property when it becomes destruc-
tive of the public good, is not a taking
of it for public use.' And it is upon that
principle that you can abate a nuisance.
There is a case in the Pennsylvania Reports
which illustrates my argument—the case of
the Catholic church in Pittsburgh against the
city of Pittsburgh. The facts of the case were
these: The city graded the streets, and laid
out one along where a Catholic church was
about to be built. After the street was laid
out and graded, the Catholics proceeded to
build a magnificent church, and used it for a
number of years, in the progress of time the
city deemed it best for the public interests to
grade the streets still more, and they cut down
the one by the Catholic church some five or
six feet, making the church property utterly
worthless for the purpose for which it was
originally built. The public there actually
destroyed that property; they did not use it,
however. It was for the public benefit that
those streets should be graded. The church
brought a suit against the city of Pittsburgh
The decision in that case was that it was not
such a taking of private property for public use
as to entitle the church to remuneration, and
they got no remuneration. That is the law.
The public must take the property, and they
must apply it to public use, to entitle the
party to remuneration.
Now, do we propose to take private prop-
erty and apply it to the public use? We re-
gard the institution of slavery in Maryland as
a nuisance, and on that ground we abolish
it. Suppose that in some city a house should
be on fire, and in order to prevent the spread
of the flames it became necessary to pull down
anadjoining house and utterly destroy it; al-
though the flames may not then have reached
it, and although peradventure they might not
reach it at all, even if it were not pulled
down. Can the owner of that house so pulled
down and destroyed sue the city authorities
for remuneration? By no means. He could |
not recover, because the public good required
the destruction of that house to prevent the
further destruction of property.
It is upon principles like these that the
Union men of Maryland advocate the aboli-
tion of slavery, and refuse to make any re-
muneration therefor, because it is not the
taking of private property and applying it to
the public use. We do not use it at all; the
public does not use it at all. It is abol-
ished on the principle of destroying a public
nuisance.
If, for instance, a brewer in this city were
to erect a brewery in such a place as to be-
come offensive to the rest of the inhabitants
of this city, it would be right to tear down
that brewery and to utterly destroy it, and
the brewer could claim no remuneration for
the destruction of his property. And why?
Because the public good required the de-
struction of that private property. It is a
fundamental principle of law that no man
has the right to use any property, indeed
he has no right to any property) the use of
which destroys, or imperils, or at all makes
to the disadvantage of 'the public good.
Now the institution of slavery is one of
those things. It has been tolerated for cen-
turies in this country, but it has been a pub-
lic nuisance and a public evil all the time.
Again, there are precedents for our setting
negroes free in the State of Maryland, and
not paying for them. Some gentlemen have
contended that slavery existed under the
common law in England. That is not so. Ever
since the case of Somerset, hi 1772, in England,
that question has been decided, The judge
in that case said that it was utterly impossi-
ble for slavery to exist in England, either by
common law or by statute law; and that it
had not existed up to that time. And of course
it did not exist by common law or by statute
law from 1772 to' 1776. when we declared
ourselves independent. Therefore the foun-
dation of slavery does not exist either upon
the common law or the statute law of Great
Britain. And that decision was given in op-
position to several acts that had been passed
during the reign of George III, regulating
the slave trade between Africa and the colo-
nies of Great Britain, Yet that decision went
to the extent of declaring that slavery did
not exist, and could not exist, in England,
either by statute law or common law. And
what was the result of that decision? Some
fifteen thousand negroes were thereby lib-
erated in England, and nobody was paid for
them. The judge in that decision says that
the court would rather have had the parties
settled the matter in some other way. But he
went on in his argument to say that if they
will have this decision, why let them have it.
And he uses this expression: "Fiat justitia
ruat coelum," let justice be done whatever
be the consequences. And that decision lib- |
