of faith on the part of the Government, or
from a failure to fulfil its constitutional ob-
ligations, or from the commission of uncon-
stitutional acts, Congress hag not the pow-
er too pay for it, or to make an appropriation
to the State to do the same thing, using the
State as her agent. The language of the
Constitution itself would seem to answer
the question. It says: " Nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." Whether or not the prop-
erty has been taken, strictly speaking, for
public uses, I leave the Government to de-
cide. It has been taken by the General
Government, or what remains has been
rendered nearly valueless from the insecuri-
ty of the tenure. The obligation to pay,
therefore, results from the very language
of the Constitution: "Nor shall private
property be taken fur public use with-
out just compensation." After the Gov-
ernment has taken private property, it
cannot escape from the obligation to
pay for it, by denying that it was taken
for public use. The Government, by the
act of taking, estops itself from denying
that it was for public use, and there results
immediately the obligation of compensa-
tion. To quote once more from Mr. Clay,
whose patriotic language I recommend
gentlemen to ponder over, in these days,
when men are so ready to escape from their
obligations, he says: "There is a clause, an
amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, which provides that no pro-
perty—no private property—shall be taken
for public use without just compensation
to the owners of such property. Well, I
think, that in a just and liberal interpreta-
tion of that clause, we are restrained from
taking the property of the people of the
District of Columbia in slaves, in consid-
eration of any public policy, without full
and complete compensation." Again:
" By a liberal interpretation of the clause
it seems to me, however, that slave proper-
ty would be so far regarded—that it ought
to be so far regarded—as taken for public
use, as to entitle the owners of the slaves
so taken to a compensation, under and by
virtue of the clause itself, to the full ex-
tent of the value of the slaves liberated."
The United States, to a certain extent, has
sovereign powers, or is a limited sovereignty
As such the Government cannot, be sued
but sovereignty is not thereby released
from all obligations arising from its con-
duct to the citizen. In Tiernan vs. Resca-
viure 10, G. and J. 225, and Plater vs. Scott |
6 G. and J. 116, this sound principle of the
ethics of sovereignties is announced, " So-
vereign States are considered always ready
to do Justice as to claims against them,
which are coercible by judicial process be-
tween citizen and citizen." Suppose a cit-
izen had thus dealt with the slave property
of any other citizen, or any other species of
property, would he not have been liable to
be sued in some form of action, according
to the nature of the wrong done, either in
trespass, cause, trover or detinue? If the
wrong had been committed in reference to
his slave property, the remedy would very
probably have been trover. Who would
deny that the injured party could recover
his damages? And no proposition to my
mind is clearer than that the same liabili-
ty attaches to the Government as would
attach to any individual under similar cir-
cumstances. And further, that this property
having been rendered insecure, having been
taken away, having been depreciated in val-
ue by the direct action of the Federal Gov-
ernment, or from its failure to discharge
and enforce its constitutional duties, there
results necessarily a moral duty, obligation,
and liability on the part of the Federal
Government to pay the damages, or loss
consequent to the owner.
Where no compensation is provided for
or made to the owner for the injury sus-
tained, he is entitled to recover damages,
which damages are the monied value, and
the compensation must be made irrespec-
tive of any speculative advantages which
may accrue.
As to the measure of damages, Mr. Pres-
ident, any lawyer will tell you "that the
principle which measures damages at com-
mon law, is that of giving compensation
for the injury sustained—a. compensation
which shall put the party injured in the
same position in which he would have
stood had he not been injured." And that
in,, trover the measure of damages is the
value of the property at the time when the
wrong or inimical action was committed,
or at the time of conversion, to speak more
legally. Where negroes are taken and em-
ployed without the owners' consent, the
measure of damages is not only the value,
but the injury resulting to the plaintiff from
the employment. Tested by these princi-
ples, have I over-estimated our claims? The
measure of damages is not the value of the
property now, after it has been taken away
or rendered depreciated, but the value of
the property so taken away or destroyed at |
