the one being intended as the vehicle of the
other; they ought, therefore, to have been
wholly exempt from the coercion of human
laws in all speculative and doctrinal points
whatsoever; liberty of speech in political
matters has been equally proscribed in almost
all the governments of the world, as liberty
of conscience in those of religion. A com-
plete tyranny over the human mind could
never have been exercised whilst the organ
by which our sentiments are conveyed to
others, was tree. When the introduction of
letters among men afforded a new mode of
disclosing, and that of the press, a more ex-
peditious method of diffusing their sentiments,
writing and printing also became subjects of
legal coercion; even the expression of senti-
ments by pictures and hieroglyphics attracted
the attention of the argus-government, so far
as to render such expressions punishable by
law. The common-place arguments in sup-
port of these restraints are, that they tend to
preserve peace and good order in government ;
that there are some doctrines both in religion
and politics, so sacred, and others of so bad
a tendency that no public discussion of them
ought to be suffered. To these the elegant
writer before referred to, (Dr. Price,) gives
this answer: .' Were this a right opinion, all
the persecution that has ever been practised,
would be justified; for if it is a part of the
.duty of civil magistrates to prevent the dis-
cussion of such doctrines, they must, in doing
this, act on their own judgments of the nature
and tendency of doctrines; and conse-
quently, they must have a right to prevent
the discussion of all doctrines which they
think to be too sacred for discussion, or too
dangerous in their tendency; and this right
they must exercise in the only way in which
civil power is capable of exercising it, by in-
flicting penalties on nil who oppose sacred
doctrine?, or who maintain pernicious opin-
ions.' "
And I wish to call to the attention of the
Convention what Judge Tucker says about
the first attempt, and the only attempt, that
was made under this government, to restrain
the freedom of the press. After speaking of
the reasonable expectations that might'. have
been entertained that no attempt of that sort
world ever have been made, Judge Thicker
says:
" But however reasonable such an expecta-
tation might have been, a very few years
evinced a determination on the part of those
who then ruled the public, counsels of the
United States to set at naught all such re.
straints. An act accordingly was passed by
the Congress, on the fourteenth of. Inly, 1798,
whereby it was enacted, that 'if any person
shall write, print, utter or publish any false
and malicious writing against the Govern-
ment of the United States, or either house of
Congress, or the President, with intent to de-
fame them, or either of them, or to bring
|
them, or either of them, into contempt, or
disrepute; or to excite against them or either
of them, the hatred of the good people of the
United States, then such person, being thereof
convicted before any court of the United
States, having jurisdiction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thou-
sand dollars, and by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding two years.' The act was limited in
its duration to the third day or March, 1801,
the very day on which the period for which
the then President was elected, was to expire ;
and previous to which the event of the next
Presidential election must be known."
And under that act there were three or
four men, one in Pennsylvania, one in Con-
necticut, I believe, and one in Virginia,
prosecuted for publishing seditious articles,
were fined and were imprisoned. The writer
then goes on to state the consequences of that
act.
"The consequences of this act, as might
have been foreseen, were a general astonish-
ment, and dissatisfaction, among all those
who considered the Government of the United
States as a limited system of government; in
its nature altogether federal, and essentially
different from all others which might lay
claim to unlimited powers; or even to na-
tional, instead of federal authority. The
constitutionality of the act was accordingly
very generally denied, or questioned, by
them. They alleged, that it is to the free-
dom of the press, and of speech, that the
American nation is indebted for its liberty,
its happiness, its enlightened state, nay more,
for its existence. That in these States the
people are the only sovereign; that the gov-
ernment, established by themselves, is for
their benefit; that those who administer the
government, whether it be that of the State,
or of the Federal Union, are the agents and
servants of the people, not their rulers or
tyrants. That these agents must be, and are,
from the nature and principles of our gov-
ernments, responsible to the people for their
conduct. That to enforce this responsibility,
it is indispensably necessary that the people
should inquire into the conduct of their
agents; that in this inquiry, they must, or
ought to scrutinize their motives, sift their
intentions, and penetrate their designs; and
that it was, therefore, an unimpeachable
right in them to censure as well as to appland ;
to condemn or to acquit; and to reject, or
to employ them again, as the most severe
scrutiny might advise. That as no man can
be forced into the service of the people against
his own will and consent; so if any man
employed by them in any office, should find
the tenure of it too severe, because responsi-
bility is inseparably annexed to it, he might
retire; if he cannot bear scrutiny, he might
resign; if his motives, or designs, will not
bear sifting; or if censure be too galling to
his feelings, he might avoid it in the shades |
