bound to recognize us as entitled to all the
protection which the Constitution throws
around the citizen. The same protection which
the gentleman from Baltimore city claims I
claim. I do not know whether the decision
of the Supreme Court will change his views
or not. I would like to have had the benefit
of his reasoning upon this article, to let us
know what are his views upon it, now for the
first time attempted to be engrafted upon any
State Constitution. But he permitted us to
go on with the discussion without a word of
reasoning, without a syllable in its favor or
in explanation of it.
The Constitution declares substantially that
no act of a State Legislature or of a State
Convention shall violate it; and the Supreme
Court is organized to determine certain cases
which may involve the construction of the
Constitution and the laws of Congress. In
such cases even the advocates of secession
admit the States are bound by the decision.
But they suppose infractions and violations of
the Constitution which cannot, being merely
political matters, be passed upon judicially
and they put the case of "certain political
rights guaranteed to the States of this Union
by the terms of the Constitution itself" being
taken from the States by the Federal Govern-
ment, A case has been put and with marked
ability, by Mr. Benjamin, in one of his ora-
tions, who has ably argued this question
With a logical power, united with a strain of
eloquence excelled by no one, " of the Senate
undertaking to reject, by a vote, two Senators
to which a State is entitled, and declaring
that hereafter she shall be entitled to only
one." And if for that reason, a State or a
number of States, decide no longer to remain
subject to the constitutional compacts, he
asks: " Is that revolution or is it the exercise
of clear constitutional rights?" My answer
would be, it is revolution, that is, a change in
the form of the existing government, in a
mode and manner not pointed out or provided
by the Constitution which organized the
Government, growing out of a subject, to be
sure, over which the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction, and which therefore you cannot
bring to the arbitrament of the Supreme
Court, But even those gentlemen who se-
ceded admit, if a subject matter perfectly with-
in its jurisdiction is brought to the Supreme
Court, as in the case of the Dred Scott de-
cision, they would stand by the decision of
the Court and not treat it as the gentleman
from Baltimore city (Mr. Stirling) and those
with whom he acts treat the decisions of this
high tribunal, to be tossed to the winds, and
reviled. Why you hold up to public execra-
tion that great man, Chief Justice Taney, who
delivered the opinion. You say the decision,
as announcing any binding rule of conduct is
not to be submitted to !
It is no authority in construing the Con-
stitution or determining the action of the |
citizen ! You will submit to the execution
when ordered. I will add that the gentleman
from Baltimore city would only do this be-
cause he would be forced, and if he could
possibly prevent the execution, he would do
it. Or it any attempt should ever be made
in Baltimore city to enforce a similar decision
its enforcement by way of judicial process
would be very doubtful, if the gentleman
from Baltimore city could control it
But to return. I repeat it. My answer
would be, in the supposed case that it would be
revolution if carried on against the will of the
other States or of the United States Government.
The act would be one of usurpation, I
admit, on the part of the Federal Government,
which could clearly call for and demand revo-
lution. But it would be none the less revolu-
tion by States. In confirmation of these views,
Mr. Justice Grier says, on page 673, in the
decision of the prize cases already referred to,:
"Hence in. organizing this rebellion, they
have acted as States, claiming to be sovereign
over all persons and property within their re-
spective limits, and asserting a right to ab-
solve their citizens from their allegiance to
the Federal Government."
The act done is one thing—the justification
or cause is another, in the case put, the
revolution produced by the act of the States
or States refusing to remain any longer in
the Union, would be justified.
Now, I put this case. Suppose that accord-
ing to this theory of paramount allegiance,
the General Government or Congress should
undertake to reconstruct a State from one, or
from several of the States, as has been done in
the case of West. Virginia; in regard to which
Judge Catron held when an attachment was
brought, setting forth that the party was a
citizen of West Virginia, that he had no power
to recognize West Virginia us a State, because
it was unconstitutionally formed, and the
attachment should be brought stating the
party was a citizen of Virginia. Would this
be an exercise of constitutional power? Cer-
tainly not. Suppose the General Govern-
ment says: "I have paramount authority;
paramount allegiance is due tome; Mary-
land shall have but one Senator, and I
will enforce it." Would gentlemen for a
moment say the General Government had &
right to deny to Maryland her two Senators,
and to wage war against the State of
Maryland, sword in hand, if Maryland
should refuse to acquiesce in such a de-
cision, and should say, ''give us the two
Senators to which we are entitled, and we
will come back and resume our place under
the general government. If you do not we
will resist you eternally."
And I may carry out the same line of argu-
ment with reference to the subject of slavery.
There stands the slave properly of the South
protected by Constitutional provisions as any
other property is protected, recognized by de- |
