the people, and not of the State Governments
We are all agents of the same supreme power
the people. The General Government and
the State Governments derive their authority
from the same source. Neither can in rela
tion to the other be called primary, though
one is definite and restricted, and the other
general and residuary. The national govern
ment possesses those powers which it can be
shown the people have conferred on it, am
no more. All the rest belongs to the State
Government, or to the people themselves. So
far as the people have restrained that sover-
eignty, by the expression of their will, in the
Constitution of the United States, so far it
must be admitted, State sovereignty is effec-
tually controlled. I do not contend that it
is or ought to be controlled further."
Mark the expression used by Mr. Webster
" neither can in relation to the other be called
primary." The allegiance due to neither is
therefore primary. To the Federal Govern-
ment the allegiance is "definite and re-
stricted." To the State the allegiance is
"general and residuary residuary." And Mr. Carlisle,
in the argument of the prize cases before the
Supreme Court, 2 Black. R., 641, refers to
this question of allegiance in such terms as
would indicate the Court would not have
tolerated an argument to sustain a proposi-
tion that paramount allegiance was due to
the United States Speaking of the Presi-
dent's proclamation, he says: "From the
nature and structure of our government, it
could have had no precedent. The coexist-
ence of federal and State sovereignties, and
the double allegiance of the people of the
States, which no statesman or lawyer has
doubted until now, and which this Court has
repeatedly recognized as lying at the founda-
tion of some of its most important decisions;
the delegation of special and limited powers
to the Federal Government, with the express
reservation of all other powers " to the States
and the people thereof," who created the
Union and established the Constitution, the
powers proposed to be granted, and which
were refused, and the general course of de-
bates on the Constitution, all concurred in
presenting this to the President as a case of
the first impression."
And the Court, page 673, use this lan-
guage; "Under the peculiar Constitution of
this Government, although the citizens owe
supreme allegiance to the Federal Govern-
ment, they owe also a qualified allegiance to
the State in which they are domiciled. Their
persons and property are subject to their
laws." The supreme allegiance clearly, from
the reasoning of the Court, only means within
the limits of the powers conferred by the Con-
stitution cm the Federal Government. There
is no assertion of a claim on the part of the
Federal Government to paramount allegiance,
which means superior to, overriding all other
forms of allegiance. |
But, Mr. President, while I contend that
the Constitution was formed by States, and
by compact between the States, and I de-
ny that paramount allegiance is due to the
Federal Government, I do not claim, as a
logical conclusion therefrom, that a State has
a right to secede from the Union, in the sense
in which the advocates of that doctrine
tain it. A denial of the proposition contained
in the proposed article does not involve the
existence of the right of secession, or demand
the adoption of the proviso offered as an amend-
ment by the gentleman from Howard, (Mr.
Sands. ) If the gentleman supposed the amend-
ment I offered contemplated any such tiling
as the assertion of the right of secession, or
that his proviso was necessary, it shows a want
of knowledge of constitutional law upon the
part of that gentleman with which I had not
credited him. I supposed he had a more
thorough acquaintance with the Constitution
and the true structure of our government.
The Constitution being founded by compact,
certain powers were surrendered by the States,
viz.; the right of the Federal Government to
exercise all the powers with which it was
clothed.
Among others, the State surrendered the
right to amend or change the Constitution,
except in the manner provided in article 5,
To this the States assented by compact. Now,
although the States were free, sovereign and
independent before the adoption of the Con-
stitution, by that adoption they limited their
right to change the Constitution and form of
government. They thus, to a certain extent,
tied up or restricted their sovereignty. They
are bound to exercise their powers with due
regard to the obligations imposed upon them
by the compact with each other. Their pow-
er or right to depart from the compact
is determined by the interests or rights
which have intervened with the other States,
by a compact binding upon their faith.
The right of a State at will—for causes of
which it is to be the sole and exclusive judge—
to withdraw from the Union, is to my mind
clearly not a Constitutional right—that is a
right conferred by the terms of the Constitu-
tion—it is not a reserved right, in the sense of
the right specially retained to the States, eith-
er by implication or express permission. It
does not result from the nature of the com-
pact or constitution in any other sense than .'18
a revolutionary right. It is in fact revolution
secession is revolution. It makes a change
in the the government organized by the Constitution
in a mode and manner not provided
in the Constitution, and is carried on against
the will of the existing form of authority.
It is organized revolution It is conducted by
an organized body—a political body, recognized
by the Constitution as a State. It is in a
word revolution by States.
And here let me remark the distinction
which exists under our form of government |
