what is meant by a forfeiture of estate during
the life of a person. The question has been
whether it was a conviction during the life,
or a forfeiture for the duration of the life;
whether it was a limitation upon the time of
conviction, or a limitation upon the time for
which the forfeiture was made. I desire to
see no such ambiguity incorporated into our
Constitution. Let us have it expressly de-
clared, if it should be of any importance
that we should take cognizance of treason at
all, unambiguously declared, so that it shall
strike equally at all. and not respect the
rights, if they be rights, of persons possessed
of real estate more than of persons possessed
of personal estate. So that I apprehend we
are doing no hardship towards any persons
excepting the persons who must necessarily
and unavoidably suffer from their connection
by near and dear ties to a person convicted
of this great crime.
Mr. SANDS. I would like, as the gentle-
man from Charles (Mr. Edelen) alluded to
me, to say & word in reply; and I shall do
it in a much calmer tone than I usually do,
becans" of the very kind and courteous man-
ner with which he spoke. Courtesy and
kindness I love so much that it is always a
great pleasure to me to return them. I wish
to suggest to my friend a matter which may
be raised by a question.
Under the English law of entailed property,
what estate does the heir take? I ask that as
a question of law touching the right of for-
feiture there and here; because upon the
answer to that may depend the whole argu-
ment. Yesterday my argument proceeded
upon this assumption that there were two
things in government: allegiance which
must be perfect; and protection which must
also be perfect; that is, to the whole estate,
or the property. There is a wide distinction
between estates taken under the law of pri-
mogeniture and those taken under our law.
There are many distinctive features that
might, and in a perfectly legal point of view
do account for the differences in the system.
My argument was only this, that the party
guilty of treason forfeited his all. Now if
the party's estate be in fee, if it be a perfect
estate, if it is his absolutely to alienate, or to
do as he pleases with it, then under my argu-
ment he forfeits the estate in fee. But sup-
pose a party has a life estate with a remainder
over to another party. The remainder man
being perfectly innocent of any crime, I put
it to the gentleman as a matter of law, would
there be any justice, any equity, in forfeiting
more than the estate of the party guilty of
the act. Assuredly not. Nor do I propose,
nor does the line of argument I pursued pro-
pose any such forfeiture. It was just this,
that the party forfeited what he had, all he
had, and nothing which of right belonged to
another party.
I said that, I thought, was the law. I did |
not force my opinion upon this question upon
the Convention; but having been asked for
my opinion, I humbly stated that as my
view; that no government has the right, for
the crime of any main, to forfeit more, nor
can it in law forfeit more than is really his,
Then I come to the other proposition, that if
1 renounce allegiance, and commit treason
against the government, I lawfully forfeit
all. That is my view of the law.
1 must say in reply to another observation
made by my friend in the same kind spirit
which characterized all his remarks, that the
fact that I endorsed the President of the
United States in many things does not of
course bind me to endorse his opinions of
constitutional law. If I endorse his policy
in regard to the prosecution of this war for
the restoration of the Union, and the asser-
tion of the supremacy of the government of
the United States over all its territory, and
if I endorse him in many other things, it
does not follow as a consequence that his
opinions in repaid to constitutional law are
binding upon me.
I think the gentleman evidently mistook
the point of my argument yesterday touch-
ing this provision in the Constitution of the
United States. My point was this: that trea-
son shall not work corruption of blood, 1
agree that it shall not. But still I declare
it as my impression in regard to this matter,
that the fact that it does not work of neces-
sity corruption of blood, which would of
course be an absolute forfeiture of all the estate
and all the rights of any party taking
under or proposing to take under the party
convicted, by no means leaves Congress with-
out the right in specific cases to punish trea-
son; as it declares in the first clause of this
section, " Congress shall have power to de-
clare the punishment of treason." I say
that it shall have that power; not a limited
power; not a restricted power, the simple
rule being that this provision of the Consti-
tution does not of itself of very necessity
work the corruption of blood. That was
my argument yesterday, and that is my ar-
gument and position to-day; that this is
mercifully meant to say of the children of
traitors, if Congress in its just judgment and
in the exercise of its constitutional authority,
shall deem the children of such traitors fit
subjects for its magnanimity, its generosity,
or its leniency, it may do so.
A great deal has been said about what we
would put on innocent children. Pursue
this argument, as a matter of law and logic,
to its terminus. When a man is executed
under the fiat of the law for the crime of
murder, who is guilty of the cruelty to his
children? Who stamps them with disgrace?
Who takes from them the protection which
God meant they should have from their
father? Is it the law? Will gentlemen say
that the law stamps with disgrace the child |
