stated the general assembly referred to to be
the general assembly that passed this law
I feel bound to say this, because I have been
in the habit of trying to have the law dis
tinctly understood by those concerned in it
and I could not agree with gentlemen here
I do say, therefore, never mind whether the
law was right or wrong, whether lawful or
unlawful, whether constitutional or uncon
stitutional, that, according to the theory
which gentlemen have supported here, when
that bill was submitted to the people and was
adopted and sanctioned by them, that bill is
a rule of conduct for us. We need not go
back and ask what the law. was before
That is the law from that hour.
These are the views I entertain, and they
lead me to believe that any matter involving
a simpler and plainer question of law, cannot
well be contemplated.
Mr. DELLINGER moved the previous ques-
tion.
Mr. JONES, of Somerset. This is a ques
tion of legal construction, and I think it is
hardly proper to call the previous question
on such a question until it is fully dis-
cussed.
Mr. SCOTT. I would ask the gentleman
from Washington (Mr. Dellinger) to with-
draw his motion for the previous question.
Mr. DELLINGER. I withdraw it.
Mr. BELT. I would like, in reply to some
observations that fell from the gentleman
from Baltimore city (Mr. Stockbridge,) to
add one single remark to what has been said
by my distinguished friend from Kent (Mr.
Chambers)) and my learned friend from Bal-
timore county (Mr. Ridgely.) I understood
the train of the argument of the gentleman
from Baltimore city to be to the effect that
the last general assembly, in voting this hun-
dred dollars additional, had practically per-
petrated some fraud, or exercised some cor-
ruption. Now I put it to that gentleman, and
to every lawyer here, whether it is not a re-
ceived principle of law in any body, especially
one like this founded upon a law, and especially
in a convention like this sitting at the
very root of all law, that the first and pri-
mary rule of construction in reference to the
act of a body like the general assembly of
this State, is that it is to be interpreted in ac-
cordance to the best intent that can be put
upon it? Every intendment of the law, ev-
ery construction, every presumption is to be
made in favor of the proper action of the leg-
islature: not only upon the common maxim
of law, that all things that are done, are pre-
sumed to be rightly done until the contrary
appears, but as was most ably and splendidly
set forth, I remember, in Judge Martin's de-
cision and afterwards in the decision of the
court of appeals confirming it; I refer to the
police law. He said that he first felt bound to
say that the law was to be presumed to be con-
stitutional, because everything done by the |
general assembly was presumed to be con-
stitutional.
And so in this case. Here the general as-
sembly pass a joint resolution, nominally and
expressly for the very purpose, as they say,
for revising the law of mileage. And the
resolution does so far revise it as to affix to it
a certain sum, as had been done by previous
legislatures. It comes before us as the act of
the regularly organized legislative branch of
the State government. And are we to stand
here and say that it was the result of fraud
and corruption? Is it proper legal construc-
tion for us to take the ground that that act
of the legislature was done in any except the
most honorable and proper mode in which
they can exercise their legislative functions?
Not only are we bound to presume that, but if
there are different constructions which can
be placed upon the law, are we bound, as
lawyers and legislators, to search about
among the different constructions that can
be found, so as to put upon it precisely that
construction which would tally with the con-
stitutional power of the legislature. And if
we can possibly find such a construction, we
are bound to take it and none other.
Now the construction which has received
tile assent of nearly all the lawyers of this
body, is that this act of the legislature was
a change, a readjustment of the question of
mileage, and was entirely proper and consti-
tutional. And it seems to me that, upon
every just principle of law, it is our duty,
until the contrary shall be made manifest by
evidence, to take that as the proper rule of
action for this body. These are all the ob-
servations I desire to make.
Mr. ECKER moved the previous question,
Mr. JONES, of Somerset. I trust that will
not be sustained.
The motion for the previous question was
not seconded.
Mr JONES, of Somerset. This question is
entirely new to me, not having been present
when it was agitated on a former occasion.
But on listening to the debate, and looking
at the law, I entirely concur in the opinion
expressed by the gentleman from Anne Arun-
del (Mr. Miller) and the gentleman from Kent
(Mr. Chambers.) it is a question of statu-
tory construction, and I was surprised to hear
gentlemen so well versed in the rules of law
which govern such a question as the gentle-
men from Baltimore city, (Messrs. Stock-
bridge and Daniel,) referring to what took
place in the house of delegates of the last gen-
eral assembly, and to the injustice and ine-
quality of the resolution about mileage adop-
ted by that assembly, as reasons for their con-
struction. We must look at the law as it
stands upon the statute book, and interpret
its meaning by the well known rules of con-
struction of statutes. Now what is the case ?
The constitution provides that " no money
shall be drawn from the treasury of the State, |
