those rights in determining the question of
acceptance or rejection. And you will in my
humble judgment transcend your powers and
your obligations, by venturing to go beyond
your duty to introduce a system which can
have no possible support from any obligation
or any power or any authority which has been
conferred upon you, and which, as I said be-
fore, in the event of the rejection of this con-
stitution you will find to have been mere
waste paper.
I submit, whether under these circumstances
a majority of this house will persevere in the
infliction of what at least I esteem the most
aggravated outrage upon our rights which
has been suggested by any member of this
body, I say this without any purpose to
offend the personal feeling of any gentleman
upon this floor. I say it from a high sense of
duty. I say it under the belief that this act,
if consummated, will not fail to be regarded
by a large portion of these people as oppres-
sion of the grossest character, without any
warrant of authority.
Mr. RIDGELY. I propose to occupy but a few
moments of the time of this convention. A
great deal that has been said by the honorable
gentleman from Kent (Mr. Chambers,) in view
of the tone and temper in which the sentiments
have been expressed, sufficiently answers itself.
It indicates to my mind at least that there has
been much more feeling and excitement than
deliberate judgment. I propose to vindicate
this report upon the theories of law; and I
propose in my humble way to acquit it of all
the imputations of outrage and indignity and
wrong which the gentleman has charged to
be its purpose, I believe that all that we are
charged by this proposition with doing,
taking away from the people their rights,
denying to them the exercise of their prerog-
ative, is wholly without warrant or founda-
tion, in view of the theories of the existence
of this body.
I had occasion some weeks ago, when the
question of the proper exposition of the con-
vention bill was before the house, arising out
of the question of the qualification of mem-
bers of this body, to express my views upon
the theories of that convention bill; and the
gentleman from Kent took occasion to express
his theory of the convention bill.
We differed toto caelo. I but repeat, what I
then said when I again remark that I believe
that that convention bill indorsed by the
people, submitted to the people by the legis-
lature, is the programme, or projet, by which
this constitutional convention was to be
assembled and organized, and by which its
powers were to be exerted, and by virtue of
the indorsement which the people gave to it,
became the fundamental law; and that in
exercising our prerogatives here, our func-
tions here, we were controlled by the conven-
tion bill, not by reason of the fact that it was
a mere act of the general assembly, but by |
reason of the fact that the people, the great
sovereigns, the people, had indorsed it and
gave to it organic life, so far as it described
the powers which were to be exercised un-
der it.
I have heard nothing which has induced
me to believe that that theory was founded
in error. I believe it is a sound theory. Al-
though the honorable gentleman from Kent
on that occasion confined the powers of the
convention bill exclusively to the mere theory
of indicating the process by which the body
was to be assembled, and by which it was to
be put in motion when assembled, and denied
that even into that convention bill we could
look for the qualifications of members, disre-
garding the qualifications of members as an
inherent part of the machinery necessary to
put the body in motion; yet I hold that the
very admission that we were bound by the
form and terms of the bill even in a single
iota, admits the whole obligation; that if we
were bound by the phraseology and terms of
the convention bill, to adhere to it even in
the organization of the house, the force of the
obligation could not be restrained but that it
became full and ample.
Under that theory of the law let us look at
the convention bill, and see what it provides.
1 read from the sixth section :
" And be it enacted, That the constitution
and form of government adopted by the said
convention as aforesaid, shall besubmitted to
the legal and qualified voters of the State, for
their adoption or rejection, at such time, in
such manner, and subject to such rules and
regulations as said convention may pre-
scribe."
1 pray you, gentlemen, is there any limita-
tion as to the power of this body to prescribe
rules and regulations? May you not prescribe
the qualifications of the voter as well as fix
the day of election? May yon not prescribe
the qualifications of the voter as well as the
period of time within which the election shall
be held? Who shall say how, when, or
where this power is to be restrained? The leg-
islature have not qualified it nor limited it,
beyond the terms employed in the act itself;
and the people have indorsed at the ballot box
the projet of law submitted to them by virtue
of the authority of the legislature. We are
here then armed with the power of the people.;
and by the authority of the people are we ex-
ercising the function which we propose now
to exercise, to submit this instrument to them
for their adoption or their rejection, pursuant
to the very terms which they themselves have
prescribed.
1 propose to confine my observations en-
tirely to this theory of the law, to discuss this
question as a question of law. I hold, there-
fore,—1 may be wrong, but if wrong it is my
honest judgment, and on that judgment I have
framed this report—1 hold that the conven-
tion bill, by virtue of the power inspired into |
