of them. The ground I take is that we are
acting under these rules, because we have
acted in obedience to the rules in suspending
this fifty-third rule.
Mr, CUSHING. I am indebted to my col-
league for the suggestion that the gentleman
from Cecil (Mr. Pugh) wants to eat his cake
and have it. He has suspended the fifty-third
rule and yet he wishes it to be operative.
The forty-seventh rule is :
"Rule 47. The rules of parliamentary
practice shall govern the convention in all
cases to which they are applicable, and in
which they are not Inconsistent with the
standing rules and orders of the convention."
The only rule in reference to amending a
report upon the third reading which is in-
consistent with the parliamentary practice is
the fifty-third rule, which in the present case
does not exist because it has been suspended
in its operation. I hope and trust that the
gentleman from Cecil having made the mo-
tion to suspend the rule in order that this
question might be settled, the convention will
settle it according to the parliamentary law,
and will pass the report in exactly the form
it was agreed upon on its second reading and
admit no amendment whatever.
Mr. STOCKBRIDGE. I rise to a question of
order, that a point of order is not debatable,
The PRESIDENT. The chair can permit the
discussion to go on.
Mr. CUSHING resumed: Therefore I say
that the fifty-third rule being suspended no
longer operates, and therefore the convention
is thrown back upon the forty-seventh rule
which confines us to parliamentary practice.
Now, in parliamentary practice, I can only
go to the highest authority in this country—
the house of congress—which do not allow a
bill to be amended upon its third reading.
We have suspended the only rule which
made our practice different from that of con-
gress. We fall back upon the forty-seventh
rule, which refers us back to parliamentary
practice. I rise therefore to the point of or-
der that the proposition being to amend upon
the third reading, and the fifty-third rule
being suspended, it is not in order.
Mr. NEGLEY. I think the point taken by
the gentleman from Baltimore city (Mr.
Cushing) is perfectly clear. By what au-
thority or power do you take up this report
and amend it upon the third reading? Is it
by general parliamentary law—by authority
outside of our rules? No, sir. It is by the
fifty-third rule. That is the only power in
the rules of this house by which you can
amend a report upon its third reading. There
is no other rule or .rules in this whole body
of rules by which you can touch a report
upon its third reading for the purpose of
emendation. What have we done? We
have suspended the very rule which gives us
the power of emendation. Where is the
power. then? If we have it anywhere it is |
in the general parliamentary law. By the
forty-seventh rule yon are not only govern-
ed as a general principle by parliamentary
law, but that rule expressly says that you
shall fall back upon parliamentary law, and
that parliamentary law is that you cannot
amend a report upon its third reading.
Mr. CHAMBERS. It seems to me that the
ingenuity of the gentleman from Baltimore
(Mr, Cushing) has had the effect to obfuscate
this business. There are certain parliament-
ary rules, and where nothing is said upon a
particular point legislative bodies choose to
regulate themselves by those rules. That is
a conventional affair. They may do so or
they may not, as they please. With regard
to this matter this body has made its selec-
tion. There are certain rules of parliament-
ary law, but we have adopted a different
law.
Mr. CUSHING. We have suspended it.
Mr. CHAMBERS. We have not done such a
thing. We have not suspended the whole.
The gentleman has talked himself into a fog,
but I do not think he can talk us into it.
What is the history of this particular par-
liamentary rule? We have said distinctly
that we will not adopt it—we will adopt
another rule. The parliamentary rule is that
you cannot suspend a rule without a vote of
two-thirds. We have no such rule. We
have repudiated that parliamentary rule. We
have adopted another rule for our govern-
ment, and we say, taking this rule and the
rule for suspension together, that except in
cases where we suspend this rule we will re-
quire a majority of the whole number of
votes to pass an amendment. But we have
repudiated the parliamentary rule. We have
declared as perfectly and effectually as if it
had been in words that we will not adopt the
parliamentary rule of requiring two-thirds
to suspend the rule. We have suspended the
operation of one of these rules. To suspend
it is not to destroy it or to remove it. We
merely say that as to this particular vote it
shall be suspended. Then you bring it back
to parliamentary rule, and what is the re-
sult? You have the parliamentary law
hanging over you, and you have a suspended
rule directly in opposition to it—two rules
upon this subject—one in a state of suspense,
and the other in the state of adoption. It
seems to me that it is a very clear thing that
the rule cannot be destroyed by a vote not
mentioning it, relating to it, or referring to
it. The parliamentary rule has no existence
in this body in this case. When we adopted
the other rule we virtually discarded it as
fully as if we had said so in so many words.
Mr. DANIEL. It seems to me that the forty-
second rule will control this. It says :
"All questions except those otherwise here-
in provided for, shall be determined by a
majority of the members present,"
This is a question not otherwise provided |
