your judges, that moment you are going to
have your political cliques and caucuses got
together to go to your two judges and get
them to appoint this man or that man to
office. What else do you do? You have
already put a provision into the constitution
electing judges for fifteen years. This gives
power to the judges after they are elected to
keep men on the bench as magistrates for that
length of time.
I say if there is any truth in the principle
that all government originates of right from
the people, and the people have exercised this
power in electing their magistrates, with all
the other officers elected under the constitu-
tion, you have no more right to take away
from the people the right to elect their magis-
trates and their constables than you have to
take away the right to elect their judges.
Where is the difference? Your magistrate's
courts sit in cases to range from one cent up
to $160; and therefore are more intimately
acquainted with the people of your State
than the judges of your circuit courts. I
venture to assert that nine-tenths of the cases
tried in your State are tried before these very
magistrates' courts. Still it is proposed to
take this away from the people, and give
that right to one man in a circuit composed
of two counties in some cases, and in others
of one; and to two judges in a population of
250,000 souls in the city of Baltimore.
I do not say that the judges now in power
would not exercise the power rightfully. I
believe they would. But gentlemen must
understand that we are making a constitution
for all time; and if you give the judges elected
under it the power to appoint the magis-
trates, those magistrates may band together
in certain cliques and caucuses and keep cer-
tain men in office. You cannot tell how far
the principle is going to be carried, nor what
corruption will be used in obtaining these
offices. Our present judges are good, up-
right men; but it may turn out hereafter
that we may have bad men in office. I am
opposed to giving this power to the judges
which of right belongs to the people. I am
opposed to the amendment already adopted
by this convention; but I take that as
the less of two evils. The county commis-
sioners are elected by the people once in
every two years. The mayor and city coun-
cil of the city of Baltimore are elected by the
people once in every two years. And, there-
lore, coming fresh from the people, they are
a great deal more capable of judging as to
the qualifications of those who shall be ap-
pointed magistrates and constables in their
respective wards and districts, than the
judges of the circuit, elected from the coun-
ties at large. These are the views which will
induce me to give my vote against this pro-
position.
Mr. DANIEL. It seems that my colleague
is not so much opposed to the appointment of |
magistrates by the judges as to the adoption
of the appointive system at all. The whole
force of his argument goes to the fact that all
these officers should be elected by the people,
and that we are destroying vital rights by
taking this away. Every member knows
that there is a very great difference of opinion
about the appointment or election of all these
officers, judges as well as others. As I said
before, this convention has determined to
elect the judges, while a great portion of the
people had their hearts set on the appoint-
ment of the judges; that is to say, so fair as
I know, a vast portion of the people I talk
with. Other gentlemen think otherwise. But
that point has been yielded and decided by
the convention. Now you propose, for the
very lowest (and smallest officers, not to
gratify this other portion of the people 'at all,
that they shall be elected by the people. You
give these people no chance to come in, on
any principle of compromise, and vote for
your constitution and sustain it.
1 believe further that more mischief arises
from the election of constables and magis-
trates, than of judges, a great deal. It is
these little offices that control. It is a sort
of under current that controls. And the
question of swapping off a low office for a
higher one, frequently defeats a proper elec-
tion for the more important offices, I shall
not therefore undertake to reply to the re-
marks of my colleague with regard to the
appointive and elective systems. I leave that
to the convention to decide. They did de-
cide by this amendment, as I understand it,
by a very large vote, that they would not
substitute the elective system for these officers
for the appointive system.
As to my colleague's argument that little
cliques will be formed to procure appoint-
ment by the judges, I suppose if the ap-
pointment is placed in the hands of anybody,
county commissioners, the governor, or any
other officers, there are people who will ap-
peal to their friends to aid them in getting
appointed. Yon cannot keep them from it.
The same objection applies to anybody into
whose hands you may put it. I wonder if
these little cliques will not come around the
mayor's office, if it is left in his hands.
Will they not come around the county com-
missioners if it is left in their hands? I won-
der whether they will be freer from improper
influences than the judges of your courts, in
the appointment of such officers. I think
the judges, elected as they are, for fifteen
years, would be placed far higher above
all these little petty considerations. Their
offices would not depend upon it at all,
Their election would not depend upon it.
They are in for fifteen years already. They
have to review the decisions of the magis-
trates, and knowing these persons in the
counties and in the city of Baltimore—be-
cause as we have re-districted the State, we |
