court of appeals does represent the people, be-
cause the judiciary is the check upon that
branch of the government, to prevent their
passing illegal and unconstitutional enact-
ments.
The judicial power of the State acts more
closely upon the people than any other de-
partment of the government. I assert that
'the poor man, the man of bone and sinew,
the real working man of the State, looks and
'feels as strongly towards this principle of
the election of judges and sheriffs and clerks,
as to the election of the man who is to repre-
sent. him in the legislative halls. I deny that
if the people are competent, as they are, to
elect the governor, and members of the general
assembly, that they are not as fully competent
to elect their judges. There may have
been abuses in the elective system; and under
what system have there not been abuses ?
You cannot change human nature by the system
of appointment. The governor of the
State is a mere man; and when he exercises
the right which the constitution gives him, in
appointing men to office, in nine cases out of
ten he will appoint his own political friends.
It is not the same way with the people of
your State. The people of your State, as a general
thing, when they can get hold of an hon-
est man for judge, will elect him preference
to a dishonest one; and they can more easily
discriminate among the men who live in their
own neighborhoods, as to who is honest and
who is dishonest; who is learned in the law,
and who is unlearned in the law, than the
governor of your State. There have been
evidences of partisanship under an appointed
Judiciary that we have not seen under an elec-
tive judiciary, it is but the other day that
I heard it asserted by a gentleman in my city
that the supreme court of the United States
in making its decision in the Dred Scott case,
had noted as a partisan court; and he made
a good argument to prove it. That is one
of the illustrations of the appointive system ;
and it is one of the evidences to show that
the appointive system cannot change human
nature. Wherever you find human nature
you will find it subject to sympathies and
bias. The mere appointment or election of a
man to an office cannot lake away from him
that sympathy or that bias.
Believing therefore as I do that the people
of the State will not consent to give up this
power they have exercised for fourteen years,
a power which the convention of Maryland
in 1851 gave them in good faith, and which
they of right ought not to be deprived of,
because it is a right which they have exer-
cised fourteen years and should have exercised
ever since 1776, and in my opinion
would have done it if it had not been that
the old convention of 1776 were acting un-
der the old prejudices derived from the colonial
government, and derived this idea of the
appointive system from England and incorpo- |
rated it into the constitution, where it stood
until the days of reform swept it away—be-
lieving this, it is my candid copinion that if
any other system were to be incorporated in-
to the constitution than an elective system
of the judiciary, it would injure the consti-
tution belore the people and it is this which
induces me to support the amendment of my
friend from Baltimore city (Mr. Abbott.)
Mr. THURSTON. I think this is a question
upon which we are all bound to give our
testimony so far as we can with regard to
which is the preferable system. The people
whom I in part represent are made up mostly
of mechanics and laboring men. I have
taken great pains to converse with them
whenever an opportunity occurred, and I
have found them almost universally in favor
of an appointive system. They have lived
under both systems. We find that the elective
system does not secure judges as unbiased
and free from prejudice as the appointive
system, of Which my constituents, I am sure
a large number of them, are in favor. I am
sure that if we incorporate that system into
the constitution it will secure in that neigh-
borhood additional support to it.
Men are not fitted from mere persona] popu-
larity to fill the judicial offices. So far as my
experience goes, we rather find men who are
sometimes unpopular even more fitted for
such offices than those who have attained
great personal popularity—those who seek
popularity tor their own purposes. We
know further that seeking for popularity and
electioneering for office creates a state of
mind wholly inconsistent with the proper
exercise of the judicial functions. I am sure
that the appointive system will gain strength
to the constitution in the county which I
represent, and so far as my own experience
goes, having practiced under both systems,
I have not a shadow of doubt that the ap-
pointive system gives the greatest satisfac-
tion.
Besides, the people do in fact elect the
judges even under that system, fur they elect
the man who has the appointing power.
They control the party who appoints the
judges, and it throws such a guard around
the appointment that it may be said that the
people do practically elect. I am confident
that the appointive system is most popular in
my section of the State.
Mr. STIRLING. It seems to me that this
amendment is rather premature. I do not
think it will settle anything; for the next
section says that the judges shall be ap-
pointed by the governor.
The PRESIDENT. That can be stricken out.
Mr. STIRLING. It seems to me that the mo-
tion of the gentleman from Allegany (Mr.
Thruston) ought not to have been with-
drawn, because whether you adopt the ap-
pointive system or the elective system, there
will certainly be judges appointed to fill va- |
