I take the law fairly and broadly. I accept
of its provisions, I ask whether this conven-
tion will or will not adopt the law as an en-
tirety, and not adopt one part of it and re-
ject the other.
Mr. STIRLING. The astounding nature of
the proposition made to this convention that
at this period of the session we should be
asked to decide that nearly one-third of the
members of this body, deliberately sent here
by their constituents, are not eligible, and
that we should be asked to say this by a gen-
tleman himself sent here by the people, who
says that he himself is not eligible—the as-
tounding character of such a proposition is
such that I have scarcely the patience to speak
upon the subject. But as it is proper that in
regard to an important matter like this, there
should be something said to show that we are
not merely acting because we have the power,
and as I happen to have been placed last win-
ter in a position to be perfectly familiar with
the origin and progress of this whole conven-
tion bill, I wish to say a few words upon the
points raised by the gentleman from Anne
Arundel (Mr. Miller.)
I do not intend to allude at all to the view
of the subject that this convention is not bound
by a qualification placed in this act of assem-
bly. That is the view taken by the eminent
gentleman from Kent county (Mr. Chambers.)
1 do not care anything about that. I dis-
tinctly affirm that these gentlemen who are
said to be disqualified, are qualified within
the true intent and meaning of this act of as-
sembly.
In the first place, I say that this act of as-
sembly ought not to be construed as other
acts of assembly are construed. It ought to
be construed as the court of appeals has said,
that the constitution of a State ought to be
construed. It ought to be construed a the
people understood it when they passed upon
it. What was their construction?
I affirm as a matter of fact known to every
member of the last general assembly, that
this whole question of the qualifications of
members of this body was discussed in the
house of delegates and in the senate, and that
the prima fade case made was that every
body was to be eligible. The objection was
first that judges ought not lo come here, and
then that clerks of the courts should no
come here; and the provision excluding clerks
and judges was put in after argument, upon
that distinct understanding, for it was a sub-
ject of discussion and conference. The two
houses had that particular matter under dis-
cussion; and when the committee of confer-
ence made their report to the senate and the
house of delegates upon that special matter
it was the distinct understanding that the
disqualification of judges and clerks was the
only disqualification in the bill, and there
was not a member of either house that had
any other idea. |
What was the effect? They carried their
idea home to their constituents; and it is a
remarkable fact that no judge and no clerk
of a circuit court or court of Baltimore city
was sent here, although gentlemen who were
judges and clerks were proposed as candidates
for this convention, yet afterdiscussion among
their friends it was determined that they were
disqualified, and they were not sent here.
Yet the people, acting under the impression
derived from their representatives with regard
to the true construction of this bill, sent here
these other gentlemen, because they knew it
was the understanding that no disqualifica-
tion existed except as to judges and clerks.
What was the origin of this requirement
that every member should possess the qualifi-
cations required for a seat in the house of
delegates? I know perfectly well as a mat-
ter of fact bow that came there. It was
placed there on the motion of a gentleman
from Kent, Mr. Ricaud, in the senate, be-
cause of a discussion upon residence. Some-
body offered, or proposed to offer an amend-
ment requiring that the members should have
been residents of the State for five years or for
two years. Mr. Ricaud remarked that there
was some propriety in that, and to cure the
difficulty he put in the basis of qualification
required for a seat in the house of delegates,
and read this from our present constitution :
''No person shall be eligible as a senator
or delegate who at the time of his election is
not a citizen of the United States, and who
has not resided at least three years next pre-
ceding the day of his election in this
State."
And upon that reading of that article of
the constitution, and upon that proposition
as a substitute for the proposal to state a par-
ticular residence in the bill, this clause was
placed in the bill with the distinct under-
standing among the members of the senate
that it meant to refer to the three years resi-
dence and citizenship of the United States.
And I say that if the language does not mean
that, this intention, this understanding among
the representatives and senators who passed
it in the legislature, and of the people who
upon that understanding voted upon it, makes
it the true construction. The circumstances
would make that the construction, even if the
strict meaning of the language was different.
And I say that settles the question.
What did the convention mean by after-
wards putting in the bill that no judge or
clerk should be eligible? If the gentleman's
argument were correct, the very provision
with regard to delegates in the first section
would have excluded clerks and judges. Is
it not according to a maxim of law that there
must be presumed to have been some reason
for putting it in? Is it not a maxim that the
expression of one idea or intention is an ex-
clusion of the other? The express exclusion
of certain office holders implied the eligibility |
