Mr. BOWIE. Yes, sir.
Mr RANDALL. It seems to me that the gen-
tleman from Cecil county, (Mr. Constable,) con-
siders this subject as one to be controled by its
effect upon the amount of business done in all
of the districts. That this right of removal
should not beexercised if it increased the busi-
ness or diminished the business of the several
judicial districts. He seems to overlook the fact
that the very object of this provision is to secure
to the party an impartial trial. Whether it
mikes more or less business in the several dis-
tricts, is not a matter to be considered. It it
does accumulate a little business in one and di-
minish it in another district, it matters not.
The gentleman has answered his own argument
when he says that if business comes to Harford
from Cecil, the Judge of Cecil will send business
to Harford to balance the account. He over-
looks the very object of the provision, to secure
lo every man the high constitutional right to have
a fair trial, before a fair and impartial judge, as
well as a fair and impartial jury. Under the
present system of electing, by the people, the
judges, the great danger will be of having partial
or prejudiced judges. Nominated and elected by
a party, after a political canvass in which each
man takes a part, a judge must be more than hu-
man, if he have not prejudices and partialities.
These must extend to parties in court, who in-
terested themselves in this very election of the
judge; it may be the suit relates to this very elec-
tion—some difficulty growing out of it. Again,
judges are to be re-elected after terms of years—
thus keeping in operation the existence of these
very prejudices and partialities.
Sir, I look upon the right to remove a cause,
because of the prejudice of the judge, quite as
important and as probable an occurrence as be-
cause of the prejudice of the jury. If the ac-
cumulation of business is the result, and that
.accumulation causes you to abandon the consti-
tutional provision of securing to every man the
right of removing his cause from a judge whom
he believes to be prejudiced against him, you may
as well abolish the provision altogether. So far
as regards the action of the judges, no doubt they
will so arrange removed causes as to prevent ac-
cumulations of business, and have them tried most
expeditiously and fairly when they are removed,
and where the public interest will be most ad-
vanced by the trial, regardless of any slight in-
crease of the business in their respective districts.
I do not think we ought to assume that the judges
will act from any other motives in the discharge
of this high constitutional right of the citizen.
The question recurring on the amendment of
Mr. BOWIE,
Mr. BROWN moved that the question be taken
by yeas and nays;
Which being ordered,
Appeared as follows;
Affirmative—Messrs Ricaud, Pres't, p.t., Mor-
gan, Hopewell, Lee, Weems, Buchanan, Sher-
wood of Talbot, John Dennis, Constable, McCul-
lough, Miller, Bowie, Tuck, Grason, George
Wright, Shriver, Gaither, McHenry, Nelson |
Carter, Thawley, Stewart of Caroline, Hard-
castle, Gwinn, Stewart of Baltimore city, Ware,
Anderson, Weber, Fitzpatrick, Smith, Parke,
Shower, Cockey and Brown—35.
Negative—Messrs. Blakistone, Donaldson, Wells,
Randall. Kent, Sellman, Bond, Howard, Bell
James U. Dennis, Dashiell, Williams, Hodson
Spencer, Dirickson, McMaster, Fooks, Jacobs,
Annan, Stephenson, Schley, Fiery, John New-
comer, Harbine, Michael Newcomer, Brewer and
Waters—26.
So the amendment was adopted.
On motion of Mr. GWINN,
The section was further amended by inserting
after the word "law," in the 7th line, the words
"issues or petitions," and also by inserting after
the word "action" in the 9th line, and the word
"action" in the 15th line, the words "issues or
petitions."
The 29th section was then adopted as amended.
Mr. STEPHENSON moved further to amend the
report by adding at the end thereof, as an addi-
tional section, the following:
"No person shall be debarred from prosecuting
or defending any civil cause for or against him
or herself, before any tribunal in this State, by
him or herself, or counsel, or both."
Mr. RANDALL. I suppose the object of the
gentleman is, that no law shall be passed pro-
hibiting a man from defending his own cause. I
know of no law which prohibits him from doing
so now. There has been no law passed since the
foundation of the government for any such pur-
pose, to my knowledge.
Mr. STEPHENSON. I understand it has been
denied in our court.
Mr. RANDALL. In a neighboring court I heard
of a case where a man defended himself in a
criminal suit, and succeeded. There is not the
slightest danger of legislative interference at-
tempting to prohibit the exercise of this right.
The nineteenth article of the declaration of rights
would prohibit any such rule in criminal cases.
That article secures to every man the right of a
copy of the indictment to prepare for his defence
to be confronted with the witnesses against him
to be allowed counsel, &c., &c.
Mr. BRENT, of Baltimore city. I suggest to
the gentlemen to take the clause in the Indiana
Constitution, on the same subject.
Mr. BROWN. The gentleman from Anne
Arundel county cited a. case; but it was acase
where a man defended himself. I understand
that the proposition of the gentleman from Har-
ford goes a little beyond that. ft not only gives him
the right to defend himself, but allows him the
aid of counsel to assist him in his defence.
Will the gentleman from Anne Arundel tell me
whether a man can have the light to employ
counsel in a court, and at the same time aid in
any remarks or in the examination of witnesses
in the court.
Mr. RANDALL. I never heard it denied,
Mr. BROWN. I have only this to say. I am in
my fifty-ninth year, and have been very frequent-
ly in courts of justice, and, so help me God, I never
saw such a case. I will say another thing. It |
