gentleman whether his object could not be much
more satisfactorily attained and more regularly,
by requiring that there shall be no motion to post-
pone indefinitely.
Mr. BROWN. One does just as well as the
other.
Mr. DONALDSON. I call the attention of the
Convention to the fact tht when the rules were
adopted, one similar to this was expressly strick-
en from them. It was struck from the rules on
my motion, and I recollect the debate which oc-
curred on it here.
The PRESIDENT. It is competent for the Con-
vention to adopt a rule restraining the operation
of this common law principle. The Chair decides
the motion of the gentleman from Carroll, to
postpone the subject under consideration, to be in
order, and upon that motion there can be no de-
bate.
The question was then taken on the motion of
Mr. Brown to postpone the further consideration
of the subject under consideration, and it was not
agreed to.
Mr. SPENCER. I rise to give notice of a mo-
tion I intend to make. On yesterday the Con-
vention determined by a vote of 41 to 26 to sus-
tain the amendment which I offered to the judi-
ciary bill. This morning, when the House was
much thinner, by a much smaller vote, the Con-
vention had determined to reconsider that propo-
sition. I now give notice that when the Conven-
tion is fuller I shall move a reconsideration of
the extraordinary vote of this morning.
Mr. NEILL. I move to reconsider the vote by
which the thirteenth section was adopted, which
is in these words:
"In the trial of all actions hereafter in the courts
of this State, in which matter of account in bar
or set off are plead, as now authorized by law,
or which hereafter may be allowed by law, the
jury shall find, according to the results of the case,
either for the plaintiff or the defendant, as the
same may be."
All that I desire to say in relation to that clause
is this:—independent of the impropriety of intro-
ducing these general principles of law and pleading
into the Constitution, I think it authorizes a
great and grievous oppression. If a suit is insti-
tuted, the defendant has nothing to do but to go
out into the community and buy up claims against
the poor suitor, and thereby mulct him in coals
and obtain a judgment. It is placing the poor
suitor in the hands of the rich man, to which I
am utterly opposed.
Mr. BRENT, of Baltimore city, asked the yeas
and nays on the motion to reconsider, which
were ordered.
Mr. BRENT, of Baltimore city. I move to post-
pone the further consideration of the subject,
simply to add a few words to what has been said
by the gentleman from Washington county. It
does seem to me that this section, as it now stands,
does enable the defendant to buy up claims against
the plaintiff, to file them as a set off to get judgement
against the plaintiff to an enormous amount,
and for the costs of the suit. The Court of Ap-
peals have decided that claims may be bought
up pending the suit under the present law of set |
off—this was decided in the case of Clark and
Magruder—an old case which I could very easily
find.
Mr. JOHN NEWCOMER. I rise to a question of
order. It seems to me, we passed an order some
days since, permitting no gentleman to speak
over ten minutes, and that only when he has of-
fered a proposition.
Mr. BRENT. I have offered a proposition, and
therefore am entitled to speak for ten minutes.
I was about to remark, merely giving information
to the Convention, that the Court of Appeals
have decided, under the present law, that the de-
fendant may buy up a promissory note or any
claim against the plaintiff pending the suit, and
plead it as a set off. Then is a proposition, pass-
ed yesterday afternoon, which allows the defendant
to do the same thing, and goes much further
in giving him judgment for the balance. A man
brings a suit upon a promissory note against a
debtor, who will not pay the debt. That debtor
chooses to oppress him. The defendant goes oat
into the community, if a suit is brought against
him, and buys up claims against the poor plain-
tiff, and pleads them as a set off The plaintiff
then has to pay the costs of the suit when be had
just cause to bring it, and judgment is to be en-
tered moreover for a runious balance against him.
Thus a Plaintiff's effort to recover this just debt,
perhaps ends in his oppression and ruin by ft
wealthy defendant. It appears to me that the
matter had better be left to the Legislature. I
withdraw the motion to postpone.
Mr. SPENCER I renew the motion. I hoped
I should not be under the necessity of saying
any thing more upon this subject, but strange
phases present themselves in reference to this sub-
ject. There was the gentleman from Baltimore
city (Mr. Brent,) on yesterday, than whom no
stronger and more energetic supporter of this
proposition was to be found. The section was
amended to suit his own views, and now he sees
great evil in it. I ask if any injustice is done ac-
cording to his view? The Courts of Appeals, he '
has stated, decided that if a man has a claim
against another, and pending the suit the other
buys up a claim, that it is a ground of set off.
Thus the law is now, that in such a case the de-
fendant would be entitled to a judgment for costs.
What harm then is done, if, in addition to a non-
suit of costs, a judgment goes against him for the
balance?
Wherever the Court of Appeals has decided
that a set off exists, there is not the slightest
reason on earth why the whole question of set
off should not be gone into. If the gentleman
had suggested it, I should have inserted a pro-
viso, that the set off should be held by the de-
fendant at the time the suit was brought up. I
had hoped and prayed that if this Convention
was desirous to terminate litigation, was desirous
to prevent cross actions, and the accumulation
of costs, as well as to prevent the payment of
additional fees, for bringing cross actions, to
counsel, it would have sustained the section pro-
viding the remedy I hope the motion will not
prevail, and I withdraw the motion to postpone. |
