passions meets impediments and most he changed.
The evil propensities of his heart cannot he satis-
fied; he is surmounted by checks that counteract
and control him. He instructs the jury in crim-
inal causes. The jury must be corrupt to enforce
his law, unless the law is sound, as given them
by the judge. His decisions must be correct.
that the Court of Appeals may confirm them; and
if he diverts from the well known established law
of the land, his decisions will not be sanctioned.
The judges of the county courts are to he elected
by two, and in some cases more than two, coun-
ties; the Court of Appeals are to he elected by the
Judicial district, or if the Convention please, by
the States. This excitement of a neighborhood
cannot extend all over the country or all over
Maryland.
I would ask gentlemen read in law books, or
that have read the authorities of the gentleman
from Kent, to reflect that the authors of those
books were educated by looking to incidents in a
different society from that by which we are sur-
rounded, They derived their notions of liberty
and its licentiousness from the half-savage mob-
ocracies of Greece, for they had no other expe-
rience to guide them. Instead of taking that
condition of society, let us take the present state
of society, and then tell me where is there cause
for this monstrous apprehension about the evil
consequences of electing the Judiciary, I admit
that there would he some little plausibility in all
these arguments if we were to elect judges once
every twelve months, and make them supreme in
the several counties in which they are chosen.
But even in that case the general diffusion of in-
telligence in our country makes it unwise to ap-
prehend that consequences would flow from an
elected judiciary analogous to those which would
have followed such a measure in the dark ages of
the world.
We have an intelligent community. The Gre-
cian Republics, as they are called, with a few
very wise men, had communities of half-naked,
ignorant savages. Are we to derive all of our
notions of government from astate of society like
that of Greece? Of what, then, should we make
our judges independent? Independent of any
temporary purposes in society—of any momenta-
ry impulses in society. In doing this, we accom-
plish it by making them eligible for a term of
years. I wish it was six years instead of ten.
Would I have them independent of the settled,
deliberate, and calm judgment of the community?
But when the judges settle all the laws of prop-
erty, they in fact dispose of many questions that
come to the hearth of society. They have a
wide-sweeping power. Would we desire to have
fallible men selected for these situations, with the
privilege of disposing of all these questions,
against the calm, deliberate and settled purposes
of the community? Why, it is the very worst
form of tyranny. If your tenure of office is long
enough to permit the community to have a calm,
fixed intention, let that intention becarried out in
every branch of government.
One word as to the re-eligibility of Judges
There is a good deal of propriety in that branch |
of our Constitution and laws which denies to
the people the power to re-elect the sheriff of a
county, for the simple reason that he accumu-
lates a large power from having under his au-
thority a large share of the property of the
county. . . . . . . . . . . .
There was cause to apprehend that if they
permitted the Governor to be re-elected, with
such a number of men interested in perpetuat-
ing his power, they never would be able to
change that functionary. But in this case there
is nothing analogous. When a judge decides a
case, he has finished it; his decision is final, so
far as he can make it so. He therefore call
give no decision with a view to re-election in
that particular case. He is, therefore, not ill
the position of other officers, who accumulate
power every step they take.
Take up this whole argument, and read it
over and over again, and you but revert to
prominent facts known in society every where.
I at first proposed to answer the argument of
the gentleman from Kent by the very same pro-
cess of authority that he offered, but I will not
do it now; for it will be a waste of lime, the
Convention having disposed of the question as I
thought they would. The gentleman put a case
from Allison. It was a mere idle opinion, not
founded in fact. He put the case of Louis the
Sixteenth. There was but a very small number
of the people of France who assented to the
execution of that monarch, in regard to that,
if it was all true, would gentlemen adduce
this case from France, an incident in Paris, and
make it analogous to any thing that can occur
in our country? It will be very far-fetched au-
thority. Is it not well known every where that
Paris is all France, so far as these revolutions
are concerned. But is Washington city this
Republic? is the city of Anapolis all Maryland?
Is there not a wide difference between this
country and France, because of the very promi-
nent facts adverted to in the opening of the dis-
cussion here—because of these very checks and
balances, and these counteracting influences?
The small States are represented equally with
the large States in the Senate, and the numbers
of the people are represented in the House of
Representatives. The President is elected by
the whole community, with the veto power.
We have a State judiciary and a Federal judi-
ciary—all of these checks counteracting one
These views are thrown out in a very cursory
manner, because I do not feel that the occasion
calls for much discussion on this point. Not-
withstanding the argument of the gentleman
from Kent, for whom I entertain a very great
respect, I have not the slightest doubt in my
mind about the policy of electing judges by the
people, or still less about rendering them re-
eligible. But I trust that what has been said
by the gentleman from Baltimore city (Mr.
Brent) is much better than any thing I could
say on this subject, I think that the question of
re-eligibility is involved in the fact of the people
being qualified to make an original choice; |
