he could be so egregiously mistaken. Other gen-
tlemen understood him as I did. Mr, Brent here
referred to Mr. Bowie and others who assented,
I say he illustrated his argument by an analogy
between the existing case to bedecided and the case
of a moral proposition to be submitted to a man
of correct feelings and of proper discrimination,
who, if he could not at once distinguish between
turpitude and virtue, never could be made to do
so by argument. If I am under an agregious mis-
take, it is because the gentleman expressed himself
in such a manner as to lead me into such a
mistake.
Mr. CHAMBERS said, I have no desire to
change any proposition I have advanced, but
I have a very great desire to acquit myself of
any intended disrespect to any one. If my
language will bear the interpretation placed
upon it, the inference deduced from it was never
designed. I stated, what I believed to be a fixed
law, with regard to the perception and appre-
ciation of moral truth by the human mind. I
instanced cases in which this law was found to
operate. I did not say, that it was that percep-
tion of moral truth, or the want of it, which ex-
isted here. Nothing like it. I used it as illus-
trating what I did speak of, as existing here,
What I feared, rather, did exist here. I feared
that education, training, and association, had
produced in us a political sense, which would
accept or reject political propositions at once,
or not at all. I applied this last remark to no
class or portion of the convention, majority or
minority; and in just so many words, said it was
quite possibly my own condition, is there any
thing wrong in that, sir?
Mr, BRENT, I do not know that my mind is
so constituted, that with the explanation of the
gentleman, I can see any difference between my
interpretation of his remarks, and his explana-
tion of them. He certainly declared this to be
the bottom of an abyss into which we are about
to plunge—the lowest depth into which we are
to leap, and a matter so plain and obvious to
every man of nice sense and discrimination, that
it did not require argument, and that any argu-
mend would be lost. I regretted to hear such
strong language used. The gentleman then
went on to admit, with all proper humility, that
he himself might be so swayed by prejudices,
might be exposed to the same weakness and er-
rors that actuated others, and yet in the next
breath asserted, that he thought his judgment
was the result of reflection and of truth ! I will
not, I have too much respect for the gentleman,
to say that he is a little pharisaical. I do not
like to hear the gentleman tell the whole con-
vention that they are plunging into the lowest
depth of an abyss, and that it must be a self-evi-
dent proposition, which does not require argu-
ment, and then confess himself to be liable to
the same frailties, and in the very next breath
say that his judgment is the result of reflection
and of truth, I think, with all deference to that
gentleman, that if there is any plainness in the
proposition, it is in favor of the re-eligibility of
the judges, for that is the only way to make
them independent—the only way to prevent them |
from being irresponsible. There is no one argu-
ment that can be urged against the re-eligibility
of the judges, that can not be urged against
their original election by the people. This be-
ing a settled point, this Convention having al-
ready determined that the judges shall be elect-
ed by the people, I say there is no one argument
against the re-eligibility of the judges, that does
not equally apply against their original election
by the popular vote. Having established that
as a concession, there are many arguments in
favor of their re-eligibility. Are you to place
in the same category, on the same platform, the
honest, faithful, upright, and impartial judge,
the stern unbending judge, with the wicked and
corrupt judge? Are you to present no motive,
no incentive, to the faithful discharge of his
public duties? Are you to say to the good judge,
equally with the guilty, the corrupt, the mer-
cenary judge, you shall both leave the bench at
the expiration of your term, and not again have
your shoulders clothed with the ermine of jus-
tice ? You must descend to the shades of private
life, or go before the people for election to some
other office. I say the true policy is to hold up
to a man in a judicial position, an incentive to
discharge his duty impartially and faithfully.
All these objections are based upon the great
original error of distrusting the people—that the
same people who cannot be trusted to elect judges,
cannot be trusted to re-elect them—that the peo-
ple have not integrity and intelligence enough to
discriminate between a man who should be re-
elected in consequence of his merit, and one who
should not be elected on account of his demerit.
I say that the people will discriminate. I say that
a judge who has shown a disposition to bend to
popular impulses, to succumb to popular phrenzy,
will not be re-elected by the people. The public
intelligence will be brought to bear upon him; the
light of truth will shine upon him; and if he is
found to bo guilty, he will be condemned by the
popular voice.
The elections take place every ten years. Will
gentlemen tell me that popular excitement will
not have subsided before this election comes off?
Suppose that any candidate, to gratify public feel-
ing, in the midst of his term, has succumbed to it,
will not that feeling subside in five years? Will
not the sober, second thought of the people con-
demn him, and make them his sternest censors?
They will pass judgment upon him for having
done this. So long as the maxim stands, "that
honesty is the best policy," so long will an im-
partial judge be revered by the people, and so
long should he be re-eligible.
But another strong consideration which weighs
upon my mind is this:—Why do we strike at life
tenure? To avoid the irresponsibility of the
judges, so that no man seated upon the judicial
bench shall play the tyrant, or shall neglect his
duties, and be irresponsible to and out of the reach
of public opinion. I desire the element of re-
sponsibility to run through all the civil matters of
life; your executive to be responsible; your offi-
cers to be responsible. Is there any tiling in the
Constitution of the State to prohibit the Governor
being re-eligible? Nothing, except the mere |
