on both sides are such as do not meet with the
approbation of the mass of either party. We
constantly hear the best men of either party
say, that their party nomination is one "not fit
to be made." But does that remedy the evil?
Does the mass of the community rise and unite
upon a third man, really fit, and elect him?
If such cases happen, they are rare indeed.
Men of both parties may lament the wretched-
ness of their respective candidates, but if any
man of character offers himself, or is brought
forward, as an independent candidate, many of
those who have complained most bitterly of the
nominations, will say to him—You have violated
your party allegiance, your course may break
up our party organization, and however superior
are your individual merits to those of our regu-
lar candidate, we must vote against you. The
result is almost invariably such as to discourage
opposition to party candidates, and to establish
the caucus system spite of all its defects and
corruption, in still more tyrannical supremacy.
Now there is little reason to doubt, that all
these evils which we have experienced in regard
to nominations and elections for political offices,
will also be felt in regard to the judges to be
chosen under this Constitution, should it be adopted;
and it is to be feared that the consequences
will be far more seriously injurious to the com-
munity. Even in filling the almost sacred office
of judge, it is to beapprehended that the people
will too often submit to the dictation of irrespon-
sible, almost self-appointed, committees of politi-
cal managers.
it seems to be undisputed, that the candidates
for the judgeships, will generally be nominated by
party Conventions. Some of the probable ef-
fects of this, especially in regard to the county or
district judges, may be worth considering. In a
number of these counties or districts, the strength
of the two great political parties is nearly equal;
and as the great mass of each party will support
its own nominee, a small portion of voters may
sometimes control the result. This small por-
tion may in some instances be composed of venal
men. I do not mean, that they may be bought
with money, though we know too well there are
are such, but they may have certain personal in-
terests of their own to subserve .certain private
purposes to carry out; they may have reason to
desire that certain laws should not he rigidly ad-
ministered, and from some such motive, they may
decide the contest in favor of the least worthy can-
didate, because he is least worthy, examples of
this sort may easily suggest themselves to the
mind, on a little reflection. Call the attention of
the better class of voters on either side, in any
particular election, to such adanger as I have al-
luded to, and beg them to forget, for a moment,
mere party ties, in order to counteract it; yet
your efforts would be vain, and you would be
told, perhaps, that their nominee had done faith-
ful service to his party, and though it was not
proper to have nominated him, yet being nomi-
nated he must not be abandoned.
Suppose then this same man, thus elected, is
by your Constitution made re-eligible. In the |
couse of his term he will have before him a large
number of his constituents, whose controversies
he must decide. As the close of his term ap-
proaches, his thoughts may very naturally turn
upon his prospects for re-election. He has be-
come well seated, all his habits and feelings have
accommodated themselves to the position he oc-
cupies, the certainty and regularity of his salary
are agreeable to him, and he shrinks, perhaps,
from the idea of again engaging in the harrassing
conflicts of the bar. It may well happen, that
at such a time cases may be brought before him,
in which very influential men, great political
managers, who can control nominations, and who
absolutely govern a considerable number of votes
at every election, may be interested in opposition
to others, who are entirely destitute of any such
power, being quiet, retired men, or men of small
means, who have but their own individual votes
to cast. Now, may it not be difficult for such a
judge, in such a position, to maintain an unsul-
lied integrity? And if his integrity is unaffected,
yet how can he escape the taint of suspicion, and
how can he ensure that general confidence in his
purity, without which the administration of jus-
tice can never be satisfactory ?
I do not speak of these apprehended evils as
likely to be the uniform result of the system pro-
posed, but the danger of their frequent occur-
rence seems to me very great. And why should
we be driven upon these dangers ? Do the peo-
ple themselves require any thing more than a
just administration of the law, and will not they
be best pleased with such an organization of the
judiciary as will give the best security for such
an administration ? Do they think it so great a
privilege to vote, that they must have all officers
directly chosen by themselves ? Gentlemen here
have taken pains to argue in favor of the right
and the power of the people to elect the judges.
Has any one here denied either the right or the
power? Such arguments are deceptive; they
lead the minds of men away from the true points
at issue.
The right, as well the power, of the people, to
regulate the mode of selecting all officers is un-
doubted; but is it for their advantage that the
right should be exercised in the manner propo-
sed. That is the true question. I cannot believe
that the people desire to have the privilege of
voting for judges, if it would probably result in
injury to their best interests. They have already
quite as much voting as they want, and they will
never consider that you mean to deprive them of
a right, because you prop so that their power
shall he exercised indirectly, as for instance, by
the intervention of agents chosen by themselves.
We are sent here by the body of the people, and
our object should be to make such an adjustment
of the whole system of government as we believe
will operate most beneficially for those we represent.
They will themselves pronounce their
decision upon work when it is done. Because
they have the power to adopt what is injurious
to them, we must not suppose that they desire to
do so.
I repeat, Mr. President, that the amendment, I |
