it at the proper time, and before any alteration
was made in it: and for this reason that the pro
position of the Committee was not drawn up with
the view of making any discrimination between
a naturalized citizen and any other. If the Con-
vention thought that the limitations should be
merely upon the subject of residence, and not
citizenship, they would gel at it by the amend-
ment he, [Mr, B.,] now offered to the amendment
of the gentleman from Anne Arundel, [Mr.
Dorsey,] by inserting after the word "State,"
(he did not know the words that were stricken
out,) the following:—"A resident of the State
for five years."
Mr, HOWARD observed that he did not know
that he had any clear idea upon the point—"what
is a citizen of Maryland?" If his ideas were
not clear, then he would ask other gentlemen
who had addressed the Convention to make them
a little clearer. He knew what a citizen of the
United States was under the Constitution of the
United States; and be knew they used to natu-
ralize persons in the State of Maryland before
the adoption of the Constitution. But, how a
man became a citizen of Maryland since the
adoption of that Constitution, he knew not, un-
less it was by becoming a citizen of Baltimore.
The only mode of designating who was a citizen
of Maryland, appeared to him to be this, that
when a man was entitled to vote in Maryland, he
became ipso facto a citizen of the State. As such,
he was qualified to maintain suits in the Federal
Courts.
Under the Constitution of the United States the
jurisdiction of those courts attached when the
controversy between citizens of different States,
but he was not aware that the question had ever
been decided what qualifications were necessary
to sustain the character of a citizen of Maryland.
There seemed to be an identity between the
right of voting and the right of being a citizen,
because it belonged appropriately to the citizens
of a State to control its destinies by their votes.
Residence, of itself, could scarcely entitle an
alien stranger to the appellation of a citizen of
the State, but after a naturalization in the case
of an alien, or a residence of a year in the case of
a person coming from another State, the name
of citizen might properly be applied. Now, it
appeared to him, if we once, according to our
law, recognised the claim of voting in Maryland,
we recognise the existence of citizenship. He
knew not how to separate them. And if it was
so, then the bill was clear enough. If there was
any thing else, then he would like to know it.
Mr, SPENCER. According to the amendment
to the proposition, as it now stands, a man to be
entitled to the office of a judge, must be a resi-
dent of this State merely.
Mr. HOWARD. What is a citizen?
Mr. SPENCER. One moment—that is, he must
have been subject to the laws and allegiance of
the United States for five years.
Mr. BOWIE. All I have got, as a section,
makes no distinction between any class of citi-
zens.
Mr. DORSEY remarked that his friend before I |
him, [Mr. Howard,] asked what was the mean-
ing of "citizen of Maryland?" During the ab-
sence of that gentleman, the question he now
propounds was fully discussed before this Conven-
tion, and the result of that discussion, as he un-
derstood it was, that a person to be "a citizen of
Maryland," must have become so in one of those
modes; he must either have been born in the
State of Maryland, or been born in some other
of the United States, and become a bona fide res-
idents of the State of Maryland, or he must be a
citizen of the United States with like residence.
Eligibility to an office created under the Consti-
tution or laws of this State, and the right to vote
for such officer are political rights; not inherent
in every citizen of this State, and paramount to
the provisions of its constitution and laws; but are
dependent upon, and derived under them, and
are controlled by no provision in the Constitu-
stitution of the United States, which give civil,
but not political State rights, in the several
States of the Union. Citizenship alone, as to State
officers, and appointments confers neither the
right of suffrage or of eligibility. Those rights
rest entirely upon the provisions of the State
Constitution and legislative enactments in con-
formity thereto, To possess a right of suffrage
or be eligible to office, residence in the State is
a prerequisite.
There is a difference between the condition of
a foreigner, not naturalized, coming into the
State of Maryland, with a bona fide intent to re-
side there, and a native citizen of another State,
making a like removal. The latter became a
citizen and resident of Maryland; the former a.
resident only. But from the moment the former
became naturalized, he [Mr. Dorsey,] desired
to confer on both the same political rights; to
regard them in the same light that they would
have been regarded, had both been citizens of
the United States at the time of their respective
removals to Maryland. We had the unques-
tioned right, nay, it was our bounden duty to
impose such discriminating restrictions upon the
rights of our citizens, whether natives of this or
some other State, or made citizens by naturali-
zation, where some great public good required
it; and he would do so with equal freedom to any
one, or all of these enumerated classes of our
fellow citizens. It was upon this principle that
when the report of the committee on the elec-
tive franchise, was under consideration, he [Mr.
D.,] to purify the ballot box, to prevent fraud
and corruption, and disgraceful impositions upon
our newly created citizens, voted with his po-
litical friends for some temporary suspension of
the right of suffrage, and for this they were de-
nounced by the gentleman from Prince George's,
and his new political allies, as the enemies of
naturalized citizens; as perpetrating a crime towards
them as atrocious as sacrilege itself; and
a suspension of this elective franchise, for even
for five days, was denounced as the perpetration
of this high offence. And this new born zeal for
the sanctity and inviolability of the political
rights of naturalized citizens appeared to have |