stand by them, and continue to advocate, to de-
fend and to enforce them, whenever and wher-
ever, in the providence of God, it may be my
destiny to act.
Let their anath'mas come,
Ever so loud and deep,
And, in succession, quick
As falling flakes of snow,
They drive not me, from my
Firm purpose, nor cool the
Ardor of my zeal.
So much, Mr. President, upon the subject of
the right of the people to elect their judicial
officers. What now are the objections to the ex-
ercise of this power by them? Why forsooth,
that they are not capable of making judicious se-
lections—that they will be influenced by party
considerations—that strong and influential men
will exert their influence in promoting the eleva-
tion of relations and favorites, fathers, brothers
and friends, to judicial stations. Have I not
shown you that the Governor and council, or
Senate, have done the same thing, have always
done so, and will, in the nature of things, always
do so? But assuming, for the sake of the argu-
ment, that in restoring to the people their original
rights, these objections do exist, is it anymore
than may be justly urged against the present
mode of appointment? I will trust the people,
because I believe that they will select wise and
good and honest judges. To fill the station of a
judge, we want a man who has a clear head and
an honest heart. I care not whether he be a
Demonthenes or a Cicero—whether his imagina-
tion can soar among the clouds, or play with the
thunders, and storms, and lightnings, or not. 1
want a man of good, sound sense, calm, delibe-
rate judgment, and, above all, a man of integri-
ty. These are the men that the people will
elect for their judges—these are not the men that
the Governor and Senate have usually looked for.
They have looked for partisans, men of certain
political creeds. They want to know, generally,
how they have voted at elections, and what
power and influence they have exerted in politi-
cal campaigns. The people, I say, will not look
to these considerations. They will have a better
opportunity of knowing the applicants, and will
generally vote for the must trustworthy.
Sir in my judgment, the man who has a cloud
over his reputation, a stain upon his character,
from any causes whatever, which go to prove him
a dishonest man, will have, in my judgment, no
chance to be elected a judge. The people will
look solely to a man's standing in the community
in which he lives—to his general character for
honesty and firmness of purpose. They will not
look to his mere political partisanship, or to the
influence of his connexions. The people are apt
to be right, are always sagacious and discreet,
and if there is a person among them who is really
worthy, they will select him. It is not so with
the appointing power as it now exists. Even if
if it were, could we be worse off? We all ac-
knowledge that the appointing power of Mary-
land, as it has existed since the commencement |
of the government, has generally been influenced
by political considerations. Can the people do
any worse than this? Certainly not. If we
should give this power to the people, we shall
have this security, this guarantee that they may
observe a different rule; they may appoint men
according to their merits, to their deserts, to their
integrity, to their attainments in law, and to
every other qualification which may render the
appointment a desirable one for the public good.
They may do this. The Governor and Senate
never have and never will, from now until the
I day of judgment.
I think then, Mr, President, that it is clear—it
is so to my mind at least, and I have endeavored
to make my opinions intelligible to the members
of this Convention, that in regard to the election
of judges by the people, it is not only in confor-
mity with the constitutional rights of the people ;
but, in truth, that they can exercise this right
better than the present appointing power. They
have opportunities of judging which the Executive
has not. We know that when appointments
of this sort are made by the Governor, he is
obliged to rely altogether upon the information
he derives from his friends. A little caucus of
politicians will meet here and there and send a
deputation or petition to the Governor to have a
certain person appointed judge, under the influ-
ence of political considerations. I say that this
is, and always has teen, the course of things, and
will ever continue so until we take from these
subordinate agents all power of appointment. If
we refuse to confide the power of appointment to
the people, we violate that great and fundamen-
tal principle which we have professed to vene-
rate from our cradles up to manhood—I mean the
right of the people to govern themselves—a prin-
ciple to be forever held sacred by every true
friend of republican government.
But we are told that this mode of appointment
will break down the independence of the judi-
ciary. The independence of the judiciary! Do
gentlemen know what is meant in the English
Constitution by an independent judiciary? Sir,
the idea is borrowed from the thirteenth statute
of William the Third, by which the judges were
made independent of the King. In Blackstone's
commentaries, in all the elementary writers upon
the common law, our students of law are so often
refreshed, day after day and hour after hour,
with this notion of the independence of the ju-
diciary, that I believe it has become quite a com-
mon error to suppose that such a theory ought to
be engrafted upon our Amercan Constitutions
and should form a part of our American opinions.
Independent, sir, of what? If, by this term, you
mean an honest, upright judiciary, one indepen-
dent of every improper bias—independent of all
impressions which can be made upon their minds
by wicked, artful and treacherous practices, I
can understand the term well enough.
Sir, when the people of England through the
House of Commons, passed the statute of Wil-
liam the third, it was considered a great triumph
of the people over the King, for it made the judiciary
independent of the King. But it did not |
