titions upon the subject of the election of the
judges by the people, is evidence that it is not in
conformity with the public will, they are vastly
mistaken,
The election of the members of this body,
known as it was at the time when the vote was
given, that they were to come here to change the
Constitution and to form a new government, is
sufficient evidence to my mind, that whatever
opinions are expressed, and felt here on this sub-
ject by members of this Convention, are faithful
and legitimate expressions of the will of their
constituents.
I have no doubt, sir, from the first ten days of
this session, how the will of the people of Mary-
land was upon this question. And no matter
what that will was then, I have from observation
and experience, within the last five months, been
more than doubly confirmed in the opinion that
where one man was in favor of it then, there are
now ten; and in my honest judgment, if the
question of election of the judges by the people
were now left to the people of the State, the
man who should vote against it would be consid-
ered like a black swan, rather a rara avis in
terris.
That consideration, however, would not alone
control my mind, if I had nothing else to urge in
its favor before this body. I have never been in
the habit of following in the wake of mere pub-
lic opinion. My principle is to try and control
and regulate public opinion, so far as wholesome,
judicious, and wise counsels can do it, and to
make public opinion conform to what is true,
right, just, honest and proper. If I had nothing
else but the mere fact that I believe the people
were in favor of it, it would be but little argu-
ment with me. If I disapproved of it in my con-
science and judgment, my first duty, my first act
would be to commence the work of endeavoring
to change this unwise and indiscreet form of the
public mind, and to bring it back to the true paths
of constitutional right and duty, and to that line
of policy which would subserve the great inter-
ests of the State. But, sir, I am here, upon this
occasion, to justify, sanction, and approve this
general prevalence of the public mind. I say it
is right, it is just, it is in conformity with the
public interests and the public good. Is it a
novel doctrine, sir ? Is there any thing extraordinary
in the proposition, that the people should
ask for a restoration of a right which was secured
to them by the Constitution of our ancestors
Is there anything extraordinary in the proposition,
that the people should ask to have a right
which they have parted with, restored to them
provided they can give you reasonable, sound
and good reasons, why they should desire to take
back to themselves the power they have confided
to others? If they can show you that those
powers have been abused—that the trusts which
they have confided to their subordinate agent
have been betrayed, or directed to other purposes
than those originally intended, is it, I ask, unreasonable
in them to desire to be restored to their
original rights ? Sir, the appointment of judge
by the people, although they may not have ex- |
ercised it in this State, is, by the very first arti-
cle of the bill of rights, recognised as belonging
to them. It declares "that all power emenates
from the people," etc.
It belongs necessarily to the sovereign power
in every country, and it has so existed in every
age. The appointing power, from a judge down
to a constable, from the highest to the lowest,
has always belonged to the sovereign power—it
is a part of the sovereign power itself, in coun-
tries where a monarchy exists, the King has the
right to appoint to office, as an inherent, neces-
sary power belonging to the sovereignty of his
office. Judges in England were originally ap-
pointed by the King during his own will and
pleasure. They could be removed at pleasure.
They derived their existence from the sovereign,
and continued during the sovereign's will only.
This must be the case in every country; whether
it be a republican or monarchical government,
wherever the sovereign power is lodged, there
the power of appointment belongs—belongs as a.
matter of right—as a necessary incident to sov-
ereignty itself. It has been so in all times past,
and must be so and will be so from the very ne-
cessity of the case in all time to come. As I
have stated, in England the King had the right
of appointment during his will. It was not until
the reign of William the third, that a change was
made, not in the appointment of judges, but in
the tenure of the office. From having been ap-
pointed during the pleasure of the King, the
House of Commons, with the sanction of the
House of Lords, passed the 13th statute of Wil-
liam The Third, by which the tenure of the office
was secured to the judges during good behavior.
This was understood then to he a triumph of the
people over the monarchical power. It made
the judges independent of the King, as to the
tenure of the office, but not as to the mode of
appointment? The power of appointment was
still vested in the sovereign. From the day
that statute passed, until the year 1776, when
our ancestors formed the present Constitution
of Maryland, and when the spirit of that statute
was engrafted on it that has been the law of the
land. What is the philosophy of all this? What
is the meaning of all this statute of William III,
that has been thus perpetuated and virtually en-
grafted upon our Constitution of 1776? Why,
sir, that the judges may be allowed to hold
office during good behavior, but that of right,
they derive their appointment from the sover-
eign. By the provision engrafted in the Consti-
tution of 1776, you have made an acknowledg-
ment that wherever the sovereign power is, there
is lodged the appointing power, and every other
political power,
Sir, in 1776, when, by resolution, these colonies
acquired their independence, the sovereign
power was transferred from the King of England
to the people of the colonies. That appointing
power which belonged to the King of England
was, by the power of the sword, transferred
to the people of the colonies.
They had it then in all its beauty, and in all its |
