Mr. BLAKISTONE said that it did not go back.
The laws of 1833, '34, were provided for. It
was that the faith of the State should be carried
out as pledged. It did not change the law. It
only compelled the Legislature to carry out, in
good faith, the laws they had existed, and did
exist.
Mr. BRENT, of Baltimore city, understood the
gentleman to state that by the act of 1833, and
the subsequent acts prior to 1840, the fund
should be distributed in this ratio-one half ac-
cording to the basis of population, and the other
half among the counties and the city of Baltimore
in equal parts, so that twenty parts out of twenty
one of the one-half would be distributed arbitra-
rily among the counties and not according to
population. He was opposed to this principle of
inequality. If one-half was to be distributed ac-
cording to population, why not the other half
too?
If they were to pass any article to justify and
sanction these laws, he was for carrying out
equality, and he should offer an amendment to ef-
fect this object.
He understood that in 1840, a prospective ar-
rangement was made by which certain portions
of this fund were to be distributed among the
counties and the city of Baltimore, according to
the proportion they had paid in. This was all
right, and he had no objection to it.
He would, therefore, propose the following
amendment, which he thought would cover his
objection:
"Provided. That the said funds shall be distri-
buted according to the proportions respectively
paid in by each county and the city of Baltimore
or according to the basis of white inhabitants,"
Mr GWINN suggested to his colleague, that
this amendment would be inconsistent with the
previous portion of the proposition of the gentle-
man from St. Mary's, which provided that this
fund should be divided, one-half according to
the white population, and the other half equally
among the counties and the city of Baltimore,
Mr. BRENT withdrew his amendment for the
present, when—
Mr. GWINN moved to amend the amendment
of Mr. BLAKISTONE, by striking out these
words:
'And the several resolutions passed by the
General Assembly, in relation to the disposition
of the school fund, and also."
Mr. BLAKISTONE said, that the effect of the
amendment, moved by the gentleman from Bal-
timore city, [Mr. Gwinn,] would be this:—That
it would entirely nullify the resolution of 1833,
and the act of Assembly of 1834, with regard to
the distribution of the school fund, in one case.
and of the fund raised from the appropriations of
1834, in the other, and instead of the funds be
ing distributed according to the contract entered
into between the Legislature and the people of
the State, by the law of 1840, it would give an
entirely different disposition to their distribu-
tion; for according to the resolution of 1833, it
was to he divided—one-half according to the
white population, and the Other half equally be- |
tween the counties, and the city of Baltimore,
each county having one. The amendment pro-
posed by the gentleman, would take away the
whole benefit arising to the counties, from the
resolution of 1833. But if they should take away
the effect of the resolution of 1833, the act of
1834, which was based upon that resolution,
would be inoperative. His object was to carry
out not only the acts of Assembly, but the res-
olution passed by the general Assembly, pledging
to the people of the State—
Mr. BRENT, interposing, said that the gentle-
man had spoken of a contract as evidence of the
act of 1833. He would like to know how it was
a contract? Upon what principle it was regard-
ed as a contract? He merely asked for infor-
mation, not having examined the act.
Mr. BLAKISTONE said that he was not going to
dispute the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States, which decided that the State
and Washington county could not enter into a
contract. But he would ask the gentleman if it
would be right to hold out to the people, with a
view to induce them willingly to pay their taxes
for the benefit of a certain portion of the people
of Maryland, particularly of the city of Balti-
more, that they would ultimately derive great
benefit by so doing, and after they had paid their
money, refuse to give them the advantage of the
benefits derived?
Mr. DORSEY did not understand the court of
appeals nor the supreme court of the United
States to have decided that a county could not
make a contract with a State, and that the par-
ties would not be bound by it, but to have said
that in the case before these courts the sum of
money claimed was a mere forfeiture which the
State of Maryland had a right to release as it had
done. He would simply observe, in regard to
the proposition offered by the gentleman from
Baltimore city, that it appeared to him great in-
justice would be done to the counties by it. If
they were to divide the money according to the
proportions paid by each, how could they divide
it in proportion to the white population at the
time of division?
Mr. BRENT said that this was not his propo-
sition. His proposition was that it should be di-
vided according to the proportions paid in by
each of the counties and the city of Baltimore,
and as to the residue upon the basis of white pop-
ulation.
Mr. BLAKISTONE said, that whether the con-
tract referred to was such a contract as would be
enforced by a court of justice or not, was immaterial
to the case in point. It was their duty,
and the duty of the State, to deal in good faith
with its citizens. The people had paid their
money and dealt in good faith to the State. Would
the honorable gentleman tell him that if he should
come to him and tell him that he was about to
be ruined, and ask him to advance money to pay
a debt to redeem his character, to raise him from
destruction, and he should take his note upon an
unstamped piece of paper, that it would be hon-
est for him to repudiate the debt? This was
like the cue in point. He, [Mr. B.,] did not |
