Congress to legislate on the same subject. His
friend (Mr. Randall) admitted that the States
had the right to district in regard to the lower
House, but denied it as to the Senate. He (Mr.
B.) would like to be shown the distinction.
Separate the powers if you can--the power of
Congress in reference to the election of Representatives
from its power as to the election of
the Senators. The object of Congress was to
secure, in the one case, a representation of the
people in the lower House, and in the other a
representation of the States, in their sovereign
capacity as States, in the Senate. The power
could not be separated, in his opinion, in either
case.
Mr. CHAMBERS said the Constitution of the
United States had given to Congress the same
power precisely in this particular it had given to
a State. So far as relates to the time, place and
manner of election, the power of Congress and
the State is delegated in the same words exactly—
they have the same power to legislate. What
the State may do, that Congress can do—no more
and no less. He supposed that much would be
conceded.
Mr. BOWIE. Precisely.
Mr CHAMBERS. Well let us start with this pro-
position. The motion is now to designate certain
counties, from one of which alone the selection
of a Senator can be made. It will scarcely be
doubted, certainly it cannot successfully be denied,
that if the selection may be limited to eight
counties, it may be to seven, to six, five or one,
if to one county, then to a particular district of
a county, to a particular town, or street or
house. Now, sir, said Mr. C., suppose the case
of a law of Congress, naming a. particular
county, town or house, from which and from
which alone one of your Senators should be selected,
would the States submit to it? would they
regard it as a fair interpretation of the power
conferred by the Constitution? I do not mean to
intimate that Congress ever could be induced lo
pass such a law; but it is a question of power, a
question whether they cannot, whether they will
do so. Those who differed from him must take
the extreme to which their argument necessarily
must lead, and the extravagance of the conclusion
ought to prove its fallacy. What, sir! the
Congress to prescribe that one Senator should
come from Baltimore, and the other from Kent!
Why not as well say one shall be a merchant, the
other a farmer, a lawyer or mechanic? Why not
then prescribe the political character of the person
to be selected? There is just as much author-
ity to do one of these things as the other. They
can do none of them. The Constitution had de-
fined the qualifications of Senators and members
of the House of Representatives, and there was
no authority in Congress or the States to add to
or subtract from those qualifications in the most
minute respect. He repeated his regret that the
subject had been moved at all. He had felt bound
to express the opinion which must determine his
vote. His object in rising now was not to go into
a further argument on the legal question—he
should leave that upon what he had already said. |
He much regretted the temper in which that argument
had been received—he regretted the tone
and temper of the remarks made by the gentleman
from Dorchester, (Mr. Hicks,) and which
seemed to be designed for his especial benefit.—
He wished to disabuse himself of influences and
motives which it had been intimated governed
some persons.
The gentleman from Dorchester had allowed
himself to use an expression as to what might be
done by those who e pride of opinion induced them
to stand along side of Philip Barton Key, and
other distinguished lawyers! What did such language
mean? Did any gentleman on this floor
for one instant believe, or expect, lo make any
other member believe, that he (Mr. C.) could
be induced to desert the interest of the Eastern
Shore, for the pitiful motive of "gratifying his
pride of opinion?"
Mr. HICKS explained.
Mr. C. As I understood the gentleman from
Dorchester, ( Mr. Hicks.) he said he rose for the
purpose of expressing his satisfaction at what he
termed "the learned and conclusive argument of
the gentleman from Prince George's, upon the
question of constitutional law. I take no excep-
tion to that. Nobody knows better than I do
that the gentleman from Prince George's is capable
of making an able legal argument; no one acknowledges
it more cheerfully than myself. But
if the gentleman rose for that purpose, he did not
confine himself to it, if as he now says he did
not mean to intimate any thing offensive or unkind,
I fear his language has unfortunately a
meaning not intended by him. As to the words
he had alluded to, they were used in pursuing
what appeared to be a prominent part of speech,
as certainly it occupied a large proportion of his
remarks. His leading effort was to show that
this question was pursuing the same current which
hak set so uniformly and destructively against
the Eastern Shore, that the claim of the Eastern
Shore was to be established or defeated by the
success or defeat of this measure, and above all
that he was the champion of Eastern rights, and
with the strange alliance of the gentleman from
Baltimore city, (Mr. Brent,) who had introduced
this motion, and others who had not before sig-
nalized their extreme devotion to these interests,
was resisting attacks made by old adversaries,
amongst whom I am included. Now, sir, this is
all fancy work. The rights of the Eastern Shore
are likely to be much more compromised by not
moving this question at all. Those rights have
never been assailed, nor was there any prospect of
an assault upon them. In the absence of any such
provision, we have uniformly, without any excep-
tion, enjoyed this privilege. If any thing interrupts
this usage, it will be the ill-judged and unsuccessful
effort to fly in the face of the Constitution of
the United States, on the mistaken notion that
it was best to make that practice obligatory by
the Constitution of this State. Yet the gentle-
man from Dorchester had repealed over and over
and over again, his acting "in self defence," "de-
ending the rights of his section of the State," as |
