privilege of voting to provide for such an article
in the Constitution. Although he approached
the discussion of this subject with a great deal of
diffidence) he did not deem it so clear as his friend
from Kent (Mr. Chambers) seemed to think it.
He would say, in the outset, that he did not be-
long to that school of politicians who hold that
the Federal Government is a consolidated Gov-
ernment, or that the Constitution of the United
States was funned by the people of the United
States. He held the doctrine that the Constitu-
tion of the United States was formed by the
States, in their sovereign capacity—by delegates
from the States, acting for the States in their
sovereign capacity, and that no power belonged
to the Central or General Government, except
what was expressly delegated to it, or was necessary
to be implied, in order to carry out the ex-
press grants of power. It seemed to him, there-
fore, that before we proceeded to the discussion
of the constitutional question, we must first ascertain
what was the extent of the grant contained
in the Constitution of the United States, to Con-
gress upon this subject, and the restrictions it had
imposed on the States, and what was the extent
of the reserved powers which the States possessed
in reference to the subject under consideration.
if he understood the argument of the gentle-
man from Kent, (Mr. Chambers,) it was that
the Constitution of the United States had given
to the Senate of the United States the exclusive
right to judge of the qualifications of its mem-
bers, and also had undertaken to prescribe
all the qualifications which a United States Sen-
ator should have; and that the constitution,
having thus prescribed these qualifications, it
was not competent for any State to superadd
an additional qualification, which, as the gen-
tleman had supposed, would be the result of an
act of the Legislature or of this Convention re-
quiring a Senator to come from one or the other
of the districts which they might think proper
to form. By looking at the first article of the
third lection, the great design of the constitution
was manifest—that the United States Senators
should not be elected by the people—as they had
provided for the election by the people of the
Representatives in the lower House—but that
the election should devolve upon the Legislatures
of the several States. The people were given
the power to elect Representatives to the lower
House, and the Legislatures were to elect Sen-
ators in the United States Senate. "The Sen-
ate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the
Legislature thereof for six years." In looking
at these grants of power, we must look at the
design, at the object in contemplation by the
framers of the constitution. The object was to
secure to the Legislatures of the States the
choice of Senators. This was the great design,
and the only prominent design; we can conceive
of no other motive, no other reasons, looking to
practical usefulness, than that the States having
given up the power to the people to elect Rep-
resentatives in the lower House, in order to
represent the sovereignty of the States in the
Senate, acting through their respective Legis- |
latures, should have the power, and they alone,
to elect Senators. This was the great, promi-
nent design of this provision of the constitution;
all other provisions on the same subject were
but subsidiary to this. And if this great feature
was preserved by the States, and no laws were
passed by them giving the election of United
States Senators to the people, this provision of
the constitution and its objects would be
thoroughly and fully gratified. The first object
was, that the Senate should be elected by the
Legislature and not by the people, if the States
?do nothing in conflict with this great design,
they were traveling within the sphere of their
reserved rights; they were not invading either,
the letter or the spirit of the constitution, look-
ing alone to the first article of section third.
In the third article the language was one of
prohibition. It did not constitute a grant of
power to the Government. It was not in such
a form. It was in the form of a prohibition
upon the States. " No person shall be a Sena-
tor who shall not have attained to the age of
thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an inhabitant of that Slate for which
he shall be chosen." That is to say, no State
shall elect a Senator who is not thirty years of
age, been nine years a citizen of the United
States, and who, when elected, does not reside
in the State from which he shall be chosen.
Now, he would ask his friend from Kent, (whose
legal attainments were beyond all question,) if
this was not the entire extent of the prohibition?
If this was not the whole sum and substance of
the prohibition itself? Now he (Mr. B.) wished
to carry out the principle which his friend
would acknowledge to be the true doctrine—
"that the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States are reserved to the States respect-
ively, or to the people." This was the language
of the tenth article of the amendments to the
Constitution; and by article nine, of the amend-
ments to the Constitution, it was provided, that
"the enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people." He
would ask his friend if here was not a specifica-
tion of all the prohibitions? And if the Con-
gress of the United States had no powers except.
those which were expressly granted, it follows
that the States can exercise any powers which
are not granted, or are not expressly prohibited.
There were powers, said Mr. B.. that were
granted, and being granted, transferred rights
to the General Government. There were also
powers not granted, and if not prohibited to the
States, were retained by them respectively.
Cases might arise in which a State Government
had not a right to exercise powers, because ex-
pressly prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States, and yet, because of the want of a
grant to the General Government, the Govern-
ment itself could not exercise such power.
What, he would ask, became of that power
which is reserved to the States of the Union of
establishing [municipal regulations in regard to |
