plaints had been made, and if he was sure that
whig Governors would always hereafter be elec-
ted. he would still desire that he should be sub-
jected to this restriction, because the Executive
is always in more danger of error from the influ-
ences brought to bear on him, than from the free
exercise of his own judgment.
The gentleman from Queen Anne's, [Mr. Spen-
cer,] was opposed to his proposition, because he
thinks that the excitement and prejudice in the
minds of the jury, when cases of a certain class
come before them may lead to an unjust verdict.
He, [Mr. D..] during the time he had been on
the bench, had always found juries most humane
and conscientious, and he had not known of any
conviction, not warranted by the law and the
testimony save one. In case such conviction
should take place, it was in the power of the
court to grant anew trial, and, if the court
thought the conviction improper, it was ever
ready to do so. But he believed the jury com-
petent to form a correct judgment from the nature
of the discussions and proofs before them. But
how is it with the Governor? He has not before
him all the evidence which is before the Court.
What information he has is generally derived from
the persons convicted or his friends, who are ap-
plicants for the pardon, and who represent the
cue in the form most favorable to their wishes.
He thought that the Governor should use greater
caution and circumspection is the granting of
pardons. And there are cases in which the Gover-
nor ought not to have the power to pardon. There
are many complaints against the unqualified ex-
ercise of the power. Some wish it to be restrict-
ed in one case, and some in another. The Gov-
ernor was generally found too ready to pardon,
not indeed so much so as a Governor of Pennsyl-
vania, who if newspaper statements be true.
granted to a political favorite a pardon, for an
offence subsequently to be committed.
After a few words by Mr. BRENT, of Baltimore
city,
Mr DORSEY said he had only intended to say
that, under the Constitution of 1836. Baltimore
as it now is, or in a few years will be, has prac-
tically obtained the exclusive power to elect the
Governor.
He did not propose, he repeated, to add any
new limitations to this power. On the contrary,
be increased the power in the hands of the Executive,
by limiting the means of restriction in
conformity with the views of the gentleman from
Somerset, [Mr. Crisfield.] He had no doubt that
the power would be discreetly exercised. The
gentleman from Baltimore said that it was not a
Sufficient reason for taking away the power be-
cause it had sometimes been abused, but it was
agood restricting it; for appointing a controlling
authority by which its abuse might be prevented.
Mr. DIRICKSON wished to enquire of the gentle-
man from , line Arundel, if it was intended to
take away the pardoning power from the Executive,
with reference to any other class of crimes
except impeachment?
Mr. DORSEY replied. Where the Legislature
may think it proper.
Mr. DIRICKSON. One other question. Is it, |
left in the discretion of the Legislature to create
new crimes?
Mr. DORSEY replied, it was not intended to
confer any new power on the Legislature, but
merely to enable them to exercise the power
they already possessed.
Mr. BUCHANAN expressed a readiness to take
from the Executive all the patronage which de-
volved on that department, even to the appoint-
ment of Secretary of State, and confide it direct-
ly to the people, but he never would consent to
deprive the Executive of the benign prerogative
of mercy,
This power of pardon, (said Mr. B.,) must
rest somewhere. It exists is every govern-
ment and cannot safely be dispensed with in
any.
It has been said that punishment should tread
upon the heels of the transgressor, and that to
convict and punish the guilty should be the object
of every government. This is true, but a no less
important object of every government, should be
to protect, sustain and shield the innocent.
If the guilty alone could suffer, then, indeed,
there might be some pretext for the effort to dis-
pense with the prerogative of pardon, but when
we remember the infirmities of our nature, the
imperfection of our laws, the difficulty of cor-
rectly applying them, the possibility—nay, the
probability of mistake, we see at once that the
innocent may be involved as well as the guilty.
And it is for the protection of the innocent, that
the pardoning power is chiefly designed.
I repeat, then, Mr. President, (said Mr. B„)
that the power to pardon should rest in some de-
partment of the government. It should rest in
a department of high and undivided responsibili-
ty. Where can it be with more propriety re-
posed than with the Executive ?
The duty of the Executive is to see that the
laws shall be faithfully executed, and that the
administration of the laws shall never become
an engine of oppression.
The power to pardon in all countries, rests
with the Executive. In England, it belongs to
the Crown. The King by his coronation oath is
bound to exercise justice in merry. And in that
country it has been said by an able writer, that
there are cases in which the exercise of the par-
doning power is at once beneficial to the Clown
which bestows, and just to the party who re-
ceives it. It is in many cases the only mode in
which a parly can be protected from (he conse-
quences of an improper verdict and judgment.
In the government of the United States, (said
Mr. B„) the power to pardon is confided to the
Executive exclusively. By the Constitution of
the United States, the President shall have pow-
er to grant, reprieves and pardons for offences
against the United States in all cases, except
in cases of impeachment. Even in cases of
treason he may grant reprieves and pardons,
without control or limit. This power has been
exercised by the various Presidents of the Uni-
ted States ever since (he adoption of the Constitution.
No harm has been found to grow out of
it—nor has any effort at any time been made to
withhold it from the national Executive. The |
