from Baltimore county makes no discrimination
of cases, but proposes to confer the benefits of
such a provision on all alike, without regard to
any circumstances or conditions, except that the
party in whose favor it is to operate, must be a
debtor. He had understood that the object con-
templated by such provision was a humane and
charitable object. It was intended as a boon of
charity by the law, and there is no doubt, in look-
ing to this object, it is our duty so to provide as
to prevent the greatest amount of suffering and
want to the debtor, and those helpless ones who
may be dependant on him, and at the same time
work the least amount of evil to the creditor.
The heads of families are the parties in whose
favor we would discriminate. They will be the
most worthy and the moat needy recipients of
such a favor. It will not be pretended that the
man without any family, with no one to provide
or care tor but himself, stands in an equal degree
entitled to such legal exemption as the man who
has a wife and helpless children dependant en-
tirely upon his efforts for all the necessaries of
life. He therefore proposed to authorize the
Legislature to discriminate and make such provi-
sion as would confer the greatest amount of bene-
fit on the most needy and meritorious class, and
at the same time avoid screening, by the law,
the property of him who has no responsibilities
or cares but for himself.
Mr, PHELPS said, this proposition could not be
regarded as one of charity. Individuals had the
unquestioned right to dispose of their own property
as might seem to them right and proper.
They might indulge a spirit of munificence and
liberality if they please, but this Convention has
no right to provide for the wants of one family at
the expense of another. A. may die justly in-
debted to B. five hundred dollars, and the family
of the former be quite as dependant upon this sum
as that of the latter, and yet if this proposition be
engrafted upon the Constitution, the one must be
impoverished for the benefit of the other. The
principle in his estimation was radically wrong
and could not receive his sanction.
Mr. RIDGELY did not think there was any sub-
stantial difference between this proposition and
what had already been adopted.
The yeas and nays were ordered and taken on
the amendment of Mr. DENT, and the result was
as follows:
Affirmative—Messrs. Blakistone, Dent, Hope-
well, Chambers of Kent, Mitchell, Donaldson,
Jenifer, Colston, Sprigg, Bowling. McMaster,
Hearn, Fooks, Stephenson, Gwinn, Sherwood of
Baltimore city, Schley, Fiery, John Newcomer,
Harbine, and Michael Newcomer—21.
Negative—Messrs. Chapman, President, Lee,
Dorsey, Wells, Randall, Weems, Bond, Merrick,
Buchanan, Bell, Ridgely, James U. Dennis,
Crisfield, Dashiell, Hicks, Phelps, Chambers of
Cecil, McLane, Grason, Wright, Jacobs, Shri-
ver, Gaither, Biser, Annan, Sappington, Thaw-
ley, Stewart of Caroline, Stewart of Baltimore
city, Presstman, Kilgour, Weber, Hollyday, Sli-
cer and Smith—34.
So the amendment was rejected. |
The question then recurred on the adoption of
Mr. RIDGELY'S amendment as an original propo-
sition.
Mr. RANDALL offered the following substitute:
"That the Legislature shall pass such laws as
may be required to secure to the widow and in-
fant children of deceased debtors, out of their
personal estate, some provision for their support
in preference to creditors."
Mr. RANDALL thought, he said, that the benefit
of the proposition should be confined to the fam-
ilies of deceased debtors. The debtor may by
his own means, or by the aid of friends in his
life-time recover himself. This reservation for
the benefit of his family out of the deceased's es-
tate, was nothing unusual, as such provision had
been made in some of the States.
The reasons for the legal rights secured to
widows out of real estate in preference to credi-
tors, regarding the times when they originated,
require such additional provision now to be made
for the widow and infant children out of the
personal estate, viz: the protection of the most
helpless in society. In the early ages, when
dower was awarded to widows, personal properly
was of very little consequence.
it was centuries ago, when the entire personal
property of the subject was probably little more
than his cattle, horse and accoutrements. Per-
sonal property was then worthy of little or no
consideration. The widow's right of dower, a
life estate in one-third of the landed property,
was an interest in what, at that time, was ninety-
nine hundredths of all the property of the realm.
But circumstances have changed; and now, per-
sonal property in England and in this country, is
perhaps equal in value to the real estate. On
the same principle which gave dower, therefore,
in these early ages, we ought now to give (to
widows and children) over creditors,) an interest
in the personal estate. Thousands die now,
whose whole estate consists of personal property,
and that too, perhaps, derived from the wife or
accumulated from her savings and industry. Is
it just that creditors should enjoy the whole—that
she and her children should be deprived of every
cent of property, at a time when they were also
deprived of their husband and father ? More-
over, public policy demands that at such a time
as this, there should be some provision set apart
for the necessary and temporary support of the
deceased's family. He did not know what was
the policy which caused the original proposition
to be made, but he thought it should be our poli-
cy to deduct from the estate to be divided among
creditors for the benefit of the widow and infant
children of a deceased alone. It would be better
that a few creditors have their dividends of the
estate diminished, than that these widows and
children should be thrown on society for mainte-
nance and education.
And where would be the injustice of such a
course? The creditors will all know before-
hand what the law requires, that this part of the
personal estate of a deceased man shall be set
apart for his widow and children. They will act
upon this knowledge, and give credit according-
ly. The reserved property will be assigned as a |
