to the consequences. In reply to the gentleman
from Kent, (Mr. Chambers,) who had expressed
his readiness to vote for a proposition which
would only screen the poor debtor from the
heartless and grasping creditor who could afford
to lose the debt, such a clause could not be in-
serted in the Constitution. It would be ridicu-
lous to attempt it. A homestead ought to be al-
ways reserved. As to the property which may
be left by a deceased debtor, the wife and chil-
dren ought to be secured to the extent of three
hundred dollars. He knew of cases where cred-
itors, just after the death of the debtor, had forced
the widow and children out of the house and
sold the property. The Act of Assembly which
had been passed last year, and which the
gentleman from Dorchester had referred to, re-
serves only one hundred and fifty dollars, and
that is exclusively to be paid out of her distribu-
tive share. He pointed out the unjust operation
of this Act, by which a widow without children
could obtain from the insolvent estate of her
husband sevety-five dolars, while a widow with
children could obtain nothing.
"The Legislature shall provide for the exemp-
tion of property, real and personal, belonging to
any person dying insolvent, or taking the benefit
of the insolvent laws, to an amount not exceeding
three hundred dollars, from the proceedings of
creditors, and in case of such dying insolvent, or
of insolvency during life, the said property so
exempted, shall go in the first instance to the
wife or widow, and then according to its nature,
go as now directed by the statutes of descent or
distribution; provided, always, that the provisions
of this section shall only apply to a father, mo-
ther, sister, brother, husband, or wife, or child,
or grand child of the said person so dying or be-
coming insolvent."
Mr. CRISFIELD objected to the amendment of
the gentleman from the city of Baltimore, (Mr.
Brent,) and also to the substitute for that amend-
ment offered by the other gentleman from that
city, (Mr. Gwinn.) That substitute would not
meet the object which the gentleman himself had
in view, certainly not the object the Convention
had in view. The object, as he understood it,
was to secure a homestead for the head of every
family beyond the reach of creditors; but the sub-
stitute was to provide some thing in lieu of a
homestead; it was to exempt from execution real
and personal property to a certain amount; but
this was only to be done in case of a person dy-
ing insolvent, or becoming insolvent, which he
supposed meant petitioning for the benefit of the
insolvent laws; and the right of property was not
to be vested in the person himself, but in his wife
or widow, and heirs or nearest of kin. It was
not a benefit conferred on the person himself; he
was to receive no benefit from it; he must die or
become an insolvent petitioner, before there
should be any exemption. This was not what
was designed; and is not sustained by any of the
reasons which might be urged for a homestead
exemption, which be supposed was designed for
the benefit of the debtor himself, to attach him
to the soil and prevent emigration by securing |
him a permanent abode. But he could see no
reason for any exemption at all, either in the
shape of a homestead exemption or otherwise.
He thought the tendency of all such laws was to
injure the class which they were designed to benefit.
They destroyed credit; and credit was ben-
eficial to all classes; and to that portion of the
community designed to beeffected by this propo-
sition, credit was indispensable. It was better
to leave every man to himself; protect all from
fraud and oppression; encourage industry; secure
the rights of property; and facilitate credit. These
objects are best accomplished by providing the
most certain, expeditious, and convenient means
of applying all his property to the fulfilment of
the owner's obligations. Legislation will never
make men industrious, prudent, or skilful in the
management of their affairs. Exemption of any
portion of the debtor's property from execution,
encouraged idleness and improvidence, and lead
to poverty. He differed from the gentleman '
from the city of Baltimore, (Mr. Brent,) in his
construction of the act of the last session; that
act secured to the widow, property to the value
of $150; atall events, if she have children; which
he knew to be the practical construction of it.
The case referred to by the gentleman from
Queen Anne's, (Mr. Grason,) could never have
occurred; because the law already exempts from
execution articles of domestic use such as that
gentleman referred to, the necessary bedding for
the family, and the implements of trade. He
hoped that both propositions would be rejected.
Mr. GWINN said:
That he designed his amendment to operate
in favor of the immediate family of the debtor.
The debtor himself will be sufficiently protected
by the security which the Constitution will af-
ford to his personal liberty, and by the necessa-
ries which are now preserved by the amenity of
the law from the hands of the creditor. But
where there is a wife or children, it is only right
that the law should set apart something from the
assets of the debtor for their immediate wants.
It is but analagous in principle to that rule of
equity, which gives awife a right to receive a
portion of the shares in action, which pass to
the trustee of aninsolvent husband. Law should
have its charities as well as rigor. The ends of
justice are often better served by clemency than
harshness.
Mr. DORSEY opposed the proposition, which
he believed would lead to endless difficulties, and
might frequently be productive of flagrant injus-
tice. He thought, as the gentleman from Balti-
more city, (Mr. Presstman,) did, that the term
family was too indefinite, and might embrace
those whom it was never intended to benefit.
Another objection was that the proposition was
so prepared, that it might operate but little to the
advantage of those who ought to be the espe-
cial objects and favorites of the measure. It is
true, it strips the creditors without pretext of
justice or right, of three hundred dollars, even
though it may reduce them to penury and desti-
tution. It does not, as its apology, require that
the family shall be in a destitute condition without
other means of support, before this three |
