Had he rightly understood his amendment, as de-
signing to confer upon the Legislature the power
of alternating between annual and biennial sessions
at its pleasure ?
Mr. SPENCER. referred to the language of the
proposition, leaving the subject to legislative dis-
cretion.
Mr. RIDGELY resumed. He had so understood
the amendment, and he regarded it as the most
dangerous proposition which had been offered in
connection with this subject. What was it ?
Would gentlemen analyze it; strip it of its seem-
ing deference to the popular will; look it freely
in the face ? It was nothing more nor less than
a special amendatory clause of the Constitution—
a power to the Legislature, at its mere pleasure,
to alter the fundamental law by a single act of
Assembly. It appeared to him, that the effect of
the amendment would be to render the constitu-
tional provision adopted yesterday, malring the
sessions of the Legislature biennial, nugatory and
idle; and the Constitution had as well be silent
upon that subject, since the Legislature would
then have the power now proposed to be confer-
red upon it. But he regarded the amendment as
most objectionable, in view of the power itself,
proposed to be granted to the Legislature. In
comparison with this proposition, he considered
the fifty-ninth article of the old Constitution, odi-
ous as it was to conventional reformers, by reason
of the construction given to it by those who
claimed exclusive legislative control over that
instrument, an much to be preferred. This pro-
position takes away from the people the color of
participation on their part, which the fifty-ninth
article provides to effect a change in the organic
law, by permitting, in this particular, such change
to be accomplished by a single legislative enact-
ment; when the fifty-ninth article contemplates
the act of two consecutive Legislatures to effect
that object. He could go for no such proposition.
He was free to confess, that in his judgment,
the amendment surrendered an elementary prin-
ciple of the reform party. What was the cardi-
nal doctrine of coventional reformers ? If he had
not greatly misunderstood the theory of that party,
whig and democrat, it was, that no earthly pow-
er, other than the people, ought to make, change,
or alter the organic law—that the claim set up
by the literal constructionists of the fifty-ninth
article for exclusive legislative control over the
Constitution, was qualified and determined by the
forty-second article of the Bill of Rights; and
farther, that although no such reservation had
been grafted upon the Bill of Rights, yet it would
have existed, as an inherent and unalienable
right in the people. Was not this the doctrine of
conventional reformers ? Is it not now our doc-
trine ? Have we not been for twenty years strug-
gling against legislative amendments of the Con-
stitution, and demanding a Convention, and yet
it is now deliberately proposed to delegate the
very power to the Legislature against which we
have so long, so earnestly, and at last successfully
contended.
For one, he here avowed, that regarding the
people as possesssing the exclusive right to con-
trol the organic law, he should never consent to

delegate to the Legislature any power whatever
to tinker with the Constitution. The honorable
gentleman from Queen Anne, had argued that the
amendment contemplated the exercise of the
power by the Legislature only, when demanded
by the popular will; and he had earnestly asked,
Were we afraid to trust the people. What secu-
rity, he would ask, had the people, that this pow-
er if conferred upon the Legislature, would be
held subordinate to their will ? Does the amend-
ment impose any restraints upon the exercise of
the power ? On the contrary does it not authorise
a change of sessions from annual to biennial, or
vice versa, by a single legislative enactment, and
thus practically annihilate the provision of the
Constitution for biennial sessions ? Nothing is
more evident. The honorable gentleman from
Queen Anne, has maintained with great earnest-
ness, that the Legislature would not dare to exer-
cise such a power mero motu, except upon the
prompting of public opinion, because it would
sacrifice every member of the body, who had the
temerity to oppose the popular wish. It was not,
in his judgment, important whether the power
would or would not be abused. He was against
conferring any power whatever over the organic
law upon the Legislature, even in the most un-
important particular, and for a direct Constitu-
tional recognition of this prohibition, by a pro-
vision for future Conventions. Yet he would ask,
what evidence does the past supply, that such a
power would be exercised in conformity with
public sentiment ? The vice of the argument ap-
peared to him to be in confounding the Legisla-
ture and the people. These must be regarded
as correlative, as one and the same thing, to just-
ify such conclusions—and he was sure such was
not the theory of his friend from Queen Anne.
Certainly as he had already intimated, the past
was not full of encouragement to the people in
this particular, that they should again peril their
political fortunes by such a venture. Have not
the people, the majority, a large majority, been
for years struggling against the very theory which
this amendment upholds ? Have we not been first
respectfully asking, then remonstrating, and now
demanding that the Legislature shall be so con-
stituted, as to represent the people ? With what
success, heretofore, this application has met, the
honorable gentleman is well informed; and will he
consent to trust the power of altering the Consti-
tution in the hands of the Legislature as now con-
stituted; and can he hold out any reasonable hope
to us, that its present basis, will be modified in
accordance with the equal political rights of citi-
zens ? We have been sent here for a far differ-
ent purpose, as he understood his duty. We came
here to make a Constitution, to be submitted to
the people, as the only competent tribunal to
breathe life into it, or to change or amend it.
Let us then perform our proper office—our whole
duty—and not attempt to shift responsibility, or to
devolve the people's prerogative upon the Legis-
lature.
The gentleman from Queen Anne's had said,
that the first two or three sessions, of the legisla-
ture, after the adoption of the Constitution, would
be attended with an unusually great amount of