tion exclusively for biennial sessions of the Legis-
lature, because it would require a change of
what should be the permanent organic law, to
suit a matter of mere expediency.
In the course of the discussion, gentlemen had
referred to the judgment which they allege had
been passed by the people, in favor of biennial
sessions, and had stated that this judgment stood
unrepealed, and should be obligatory and conclu-
sive upon our action. The vote by the people
was cast, to which reference had been made, by
about fifty-five thousand voters, but an aggre-
gate vote of twenty thousand more had often been
given by the people of this State. How would the
twenty thousand men who did not vote, have
voted on this subject—none could tell. A smalt
portion of them would have over-ruled the majo-
rity of four thousand six hundred, by which this
judgment had been given. And it was yet to be
determined, (he spoke as to a matter of figures,)
whether a majority of the people of this State were,
are, or ever had been in favor of biennial ses-
sions of the Legislature. We had as much right
to conclude, that the twenty thousand citizens
who did not vote, were in favor of annual ses-
sions, as that they were in favor of a change to
biennial sessions. If the twenty thousand were
in favor of a change, why did they not so declare
themselves? They did not vote, we may con-
clude, because they preferred the existing law)
providing for annual sessions. To say the least,
they were indifferent about it, and hence a majo-
rity could not be said to be favorable to this
change to biennial sessions.
Another consideration which controled the
decision of many voters in favor of biennial ses-
sions, and which had an important bearing in neu-
tralizing the influence of many who would oth-
erwise have opposed it—the embarrassing con-
dition of the finances of the State, at the time
this vote was cast. The State had suspended
payment in specie or its equivalent. We all
know that men were induced, from economy
alone—in order to aid in maintaining the faith of
the State, to vote for biennial sessions. They
determined to make sacrifices of what they had
hitherto enjoyed, in order to obtain means to be
just. That necessity had now passed away—
thanks to the people of the State—to their ster-
ling honesty, and their devotion to the public
plighted faith. He was, therefore, yet to be satis-
fied that, if the question had then been put to the
people as an isolated question., there would have
been a majority in favor of biennial sessions.
Other considerations influenced this vote, as has
been stated on this floor. The friends and op-
ponents of reform by Convention, used it to ad-
vance their peculiar views, and voted for or
against biennial sessions, as it influenced that mea-
sure. But, be that as it might, he had nothing
more to say on the subject but to add, that in sup-
porting the amendment of the gentleman from
Queen Anne, (Mr. Spencer,) he, (Mr. R„) be-
lieved he was doing nothing inconsistent with
any expressed wishes of the people. But had there
not been an expressed declaration of the people,
opposed to biennial sessions? Now it was not
until that famous biennial bill had been passed,

and the people had experienced its operation,
that they, through their delegates, called this
Convention. That measure might have been the
very last grievance to fill up the measure of their
forbearance, and render intollerant things as they
were. Certain it was, that up to that time, no
such vote could ever have been obtained in the
Legislature, to call a Convention—immediately
after the operation of that darling measure of
biennial sessions was known, this Convention was
called. The reformers saw, or thought they
saw, in these biennial sessions, no hope of al-
terations in the Constitution by the Legislature,
and that a. Convention alone could afford them
relief.
If the question to be decided was, whether the
Convention should insert in the organic law, as a
matter of permanent provision, a clause that
there should be biennial sessions of the Legisla-
ture, and none other—was this Convention to
deprive the Legislature, and through the Legis-
lature, the people, of the right to have annual
sessions, be the exigencies of the State what they
might; and that, too, when in this very bill it
was declared that the Governor should have this
power? How would this show the inconsistency
of those gentleman, who were heretofore main-
taining in this Convention, popular rights with so
much zeal and eloquence, if they now refused to
the Legislature the exercise of this power, and
gave it to the Governor? Who had the best op-
portunity of knowing when, and what legisla-
tion was required ? The Governor or the Legis-
lature? Those to whom the Constitution has
confided the legislative power, or be, whose pow-
er that Constitution has declared, shall be forever
separated from those of the Legislature? He did
not think it could be asserted, that the Governor
could possibly have the means which the repre-
sentatives of the people possessed, of knowing
what they desired, or what legislation was neces-
sary or proper for them, or at which time it
ought to be enacted. Let the power, therefore,
be placed in the hands of those who had been
selected to discharge that duty, who were best
able to judge of the emergency which might de-
mand its exercise. It did not follow, as a mat-
ter of course, that we were to have annual ses-
sions. All he contended for was that they should
not be prohibited by the Constitution.
Let, the times of the meeting of the legislature,
whether annual or biennial, or triennial, be de-
termined by the legislature. Thus you exclude
this vexed question from being a Constitution
provision—you prevent alterations in the Consti-
tution, merely to change the times of the meet-
ings of the legislature which should be controled
by the temporary demands of the State.
Another view of this subject. The Convention
would, he believed, endanger the adoption of
this Constitution, by permanently fixing annual
or biennial in its provisions. Many would vote
against it, because their opinion on this subject
was opposed by its provision; whereas, their
votes for the Constitution might be secured, if
the right had been reserved to themselves
through the legislature, to change biennial into
annual sessions. In this respect the Constitution