Mr. CHAMBERS. In that case the only differ-
ence between the two propositions is, that mine
looks to a legislative provision, while his, does
not. The gentleman will not entrust the power
to the Legislature.
Mr. MCLANE said the gentleman from Kent
did not do justice to his argument. He explained
that his idea as to the manner in which provision
should be made in the Constitution, was, to give
the Legislature the power only to specify such
defails for carrying out the provision as circum-
stances called for. His objection to the amend-
ment of the gentleman from Kent was, that it
vested all the power of calling a Convention, in
an act of Assembly, as the amendment read, "ac-
cording to the Constitution or laws of the land."
The expression, he thought too vague and admit-
ted of too comprehensive a construction. Act
of Assembly was more definite. He did not
know that he had ever read in any Constitution,
the phrase, " laws of the land," except in refer-
ence to criminal cases. What, he asked, was
meant by " the laws of the land?"
Mr. CHAMBERS replied. The statute and com-
mon law.
Mr. MCLANE. This did not include all the
laws of the land. All the ordinances of the city
of Baltimore are laws of the land. He gave a
brief exposition of his own views as to the oper-
ation of the civil and statute law.
Mr. C. suggested there was no such thing as
the civil law in Maryland.
Mr. MCLANE replied, there certainly was civil
law and admiralty law also.
Mr. C. remarked. Neither have we admiralty
law.
Mr. MCLANE said there certainly was admi-
ralty law in the code of the United States. He
proceeded to say, he would not give the Legisla-
ture the power to call a Convention. His idea
was, to engraft in the Constitution a power to
the Legislature to pass a law to carry out that
specific provision. If that was the meaning of
the gentleman from Kent, there was no disagree-
ment between them. He would only empower
the Legislature to carry out the provision in the
Constitution.
Mr. CHAMBERS resumed and said, the phrase,
" laws of the land," was designed to mean exact-
ly an act of Assembly, passed pursuant to authori-
ty given in the Constitution. He vindicated the
expression, and said it occurred frequently in the
bill of rights and Constitutions, and in his ac-
quaintance with the courts, at the bar and on the
bench, for a period of more than forty years, he
had not heard such an interpretation as is now
given to these words. The ordinances of Balti-
more were, in his opinion, no more alluded to
than the bye-laws of the Farmer's bank, over
which his friend near him. (Mr. Wells,) presi-
ded. Being sort of " house-hold " terms with
the profession, they had occurred to him at the
moment. Whatever words were used, he insist-
ed on some provision as the mode of ascertaining
the popular will—the will of the majority.
Mr. PRESSTMAN asked if there was a general

acquiesence, what reason was there for ascertain-
ing a majority ?
Mr. C. None—not the least. And if a meeting
of fifty men, under the lead of the gentleman,
shall form a Constitution, and induce the people
to proceed to administer the government under
it, by electing officers at the times, and in the
manner provided, and those who legally rule the
State in its various departments, choose to retire
and acquiesce in the usurpation of these officers,
it will become the existing government of the
State; and when established as such, will be pro-
tected by the military arm of the United States.
Mr. PRESSTMAN said, "That's all I contend
for."
Mr. C. said, it was not all he contended for. He
had a right to the coat on his back. If another
in his presence assumed the ownership and dispo-
seses him of it, and he acquiesced in it, he might be
concluded. It did not follow that the conduct
of the roan who had possessed himself of his coat
by force or fraud, was justifiable and proper.
He claimed that the change in the government
should be made by a provision in the Constitution
or by a constitutional law, and then the rulers
would be bound to retire. It would no longer be
at their option to acquiesce or resist.
Mr. Webster's name and authority had been
invoked. He had long known Mr. Webster, and
at one period intimately. He knew something
of the character of his gigantic mind—the course
of his political opinions—the current of his feel-
ings.
The more these were known, the more that
great man would be admired. With such know-
ledge he could say, that he who looks to Daniel
Webster to countenance confusion, discord and
civil strife, will be sadly disappointed. His tongue
and his pen teach other lessons. Like his fami-
liar friend, Judge Story, he belongs lo another
school. His claims to the heartfelt gratitude of
the last man that lives under, and loves the
American Constitution, rest on his uniform de-
fence of well defined, national, constitutional prin-
ciples of free government and good order.
What says Mr. Webster? Why in the very
speech cited, the Dorr case, p. 14, he meets the
objection so continually and repeatedly pressed
upon us as conculsive—the implied control of
what he admitted as fully as we do "the sover-
eignty of the people." It was urged then, as
now, it was to control, to check these right. It
is now said we "shackle" them. Hear him,
"my adversary says, if so, and the Legislature
would not call a Convention, and if when the
people rise to make a Constitution, the United
States step in and prohibit them; why the rights
and privileges of the people are checked—con-
troled." That was the objection then, precisely
as it is now. Very well, now for the answer; "un-
doubtedly"' "The Constitution does not proceed
on the ground of revolution; it does not proceed
on any right of revolution; but it does go on the
idea that within and under the Constitution no
new form of government can be established in
any State without the authority of the existing
State." It must be so. All the notions we have
ever entertained, concur to demand it to be so.