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from the sources from which it emanated; from
the opinions of those who sustained it, and whose
views, as the gentleman from Carroll, (Mr.
Brown,) had yesterday remarked, would go "upon
the record which all the waters of the Chesa-
peake could never wash out." That would be
looked to as its contemporaneous exposition. The
most innocent proposition in the world might, in
such a way, become most noxious. The princi-
ple, that a mere numerical majority should in all
cases rule, was one which he had never pretended
to acknowledge. It seemed to him, that the pro-
position, interpreted as it had been by gentlemen
who advocated its adoption, was identical with
that which had been voted down the other day, in
respect to representation according to popula-
tion. If a mere numerical majority, as such,
had the right at any time to annul the Constitution
and the Laws, then that majority had a right to
be represented according to their numbers. The
one was a necessary corollary from the other.
Mr. D. proceeded to express the extreme sur-
prise with which he ! had heard the gentleman
from Queen Anne's, (Mr. Spencer,) argue that
the Constitution was not founded on compact;
when the very first article of the bill of rights
declared, " that all government of right originates
from the people, is founded in compact only, and
instituted solely for the good of the whole."
Now, whatever that might mean, or however
"iiuauid" it. uiiglit be, it was there, uui fuief«itli-
ers had placed it there, and there it had remain-
ed for seventy-five years. Whether it was a
sound principle or not, it came from a high
source — a source from which all the principles
of modern political liberty were derived; and the
gentleman from Queen Anne's, (Mr. Spencer,)
knows that it was the very principle established
by John Locke, and adopted into our Constitution
as a protection against arbitrary power. His,
(Mr. D's,) doctrine was that the consent of all
the individuals of a community was necessary to
form a government, and that it was a compact
of the whole. The terms of the compact were
binding. A compact, if he understood the term,
was something that bound together. The differ-
ences between law and compact,as defined by the
gentleman from Queen Anne's, (Mr. Spencer,)
were entirely aside from the subject. They had
nothing to do with it. Mr. D. illustrated this
position, and proceeded to show that a compact
was no compact at all, if it could at any moment
be annulled without the consent of the parties
making it.
He had stated the meaning of the amendment
of the gentleman from Baltimore city, (Mr.
Presstman,) under the different constructions
that might be put upon it; and that there was a
certain class of gentlemen (amongst whom, as
he understood the gentleman from Baltimore city,
Mr. Presstman, was to be placed,) putting a
large and radical construction upon it — a con-
struction against which, he, (Mr. D.,) protested,
and which he did not desire to see sent out from
this Convention, without the addition contempla-
ted by the amendment of the gentleman from
Kent, (Mr Chambers.)
The gentleman from Baltimore city, (Mr.
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Presstman,) in his remarks, had cited the autho-
rity of the late John C. Calhoun. However
much he, [Mr, D.,] might disagree with that
great man in some of the principles he had main-
tained, as to the relative powers and duties of
the general and State governments of the Union,
yet he,',[Mr. D.,] declared that illustrious-states-
man's theory of government were identical
with that which he, [Mr. D.,] had avowed,
and in direct opposition to that of the gentle-
man from the city of Baltimore. Mr. D. read
several extracts from the speeches of Mr. Cal-
houn in support of this position; and asked wheth-
er any thing could be more explicit? [Calhoun's
Speeches, pp. 29, 65, 247, ed. of 1843.] How-
ever much the opinions of Mr.; Calhoun might
have changed, or seemed to have changed, upon
other questions, he had in this stood from the
beginning, firm and immovable, "like a great
sea-mark standing every flaw."
According to the argument of gentlemen, this
Constitution was not to bind us a single moment,
if a bare numerical majority should decree its
destruction. Of course, then, the protection of
the minority was gone. Now, the true principle
was, not that numbers should have no weight ;
not that wealth should have no weight; not that
territory should have no weight; not that other
considerations growing out of divided or aggre-
gated interests should have no weight; but that,
when a government was to be made for the people
of a State, all these interests should be consider-
ed. Upon this question of representation, for
instance, he was for a compromise — but against
the principle for ever, that a mere majority of
numbers should have the right to govern the rest
absolutely. The advantage and the interest of
the whole were to be consulted, and he had not
the slightest idea that any interest would be
injured when such a compromise was made.
Wherever there is danger of one aggregated
interest possessing the whole power in a 8ta£t
it was wrong and must lead to injustice. He
stated that the decision of political questions
and elections by majorities, was merely a rule
of convenience; and that, for the same object, the
power of deciding such questions, was often giv-
en, as in this State, to mere pluralties.
He then proceeded to reply to the argument of
Mr. JOHNSON, made a day or two since. That
gentleman had said that a bare numerical majori-
ty of the people had a right at any moment, and
in any manner, to annul the whole or any part of
the Constitution, because, in his own words,
" the eternal people were immortal." Now, if
the people, in all its component parts, were eter-
nal, then they were eternally bound by any com-
pact. If, however, the gentleman's reasoning
on that point was sound, it would lead directly
to the result of repudiation; because, if the com-
pact of the people with each other was not bind-
ing for a single day, neither could the contract
of the whole, with any creditor of the State, be
binding for a longer time. He knew that there
was a question, how far this power of binding a
community from generation to generation could
be exercised, yet it presented no practical diffi-
culty, because we are bound to place such pro-
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