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LETTER ON ENFORCING LAWS AGAINST
INCITING TO RIOT

August 21, 1967

Colonel Robert J. Lally, Superintendent
Maryland State Police
Pikesville, Maryland 21208

Dear Colonel Lally:

On July 30th I made the following statement concerning inflam-
matory speeches in this State:

"In Maryland, rioting or inciting to riot, no matter what wrong
is said to be the cause, will not be tolerated. There are proper ways
to protest and they must be used. It shall now be the policy in this
State to immediately arrest any person inciting to riot and to not
allow that person to finish his vicious speech. "

Events subsequent to this statement convince me that its meaning
has been widely misunderstood by segments of the public and certain
public officials. It was never my intention to impose any type of "prior
restraint" on the speech of anyone. The words I used are clear on this
point. I advocated the arrest of those who were "inciting to riot, " not
the arrest of those who were making speeches in tense subjects with
no threat of violence discernible. It is only in cases where a "clear and
present danger" of violence is present that the speech should be inter-
rupted. Such has been the test since Justice Holmes' opinion in
Schenck v. United States in 1919.

Please take the necessary steps to familiarize all officers of the Mary-
land State Police with the legal tests applied in cases involving free-
dom of speech. I think an excellent statement of these principles is
embodied in the following passage from the Supreme Court in Chap-
lisky v. New Hampshire:

"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words — those