before the end of the time, was premature, and that the
caveator being the first and only applicant after the time, is entitled
to a preference. In so deciding, the chancellor by no means
would have it understood that he supposes absolute verity to
reside in either a warrant from the land office, or in the
record thereof, made out (with great propriety) by the register.
[If] at any time it shall be alledged that the date, or description
of land, or any thing else contained in a warrant, hath been
altered, the chancellor conceives that evidence may be admitted
to support the allegation, and that if the allegation shall be
thereby established, the warrant will be adjudged void, or
amended, according to the circumstances of the case, and to the
dictates of common sense and equity. In the present case it
appears to the chancellor that a mistake was made by the
register, in dating the warrant July 5th instead of June 26th.
Whether or not that mistake could have been corrected, so
as to prevent the warrant from continuing in force beyond the
day when it ought to have expired, it is not material to
examine. But certain it is, that, at the time of issuing the
warrant, no individual citizen was legally interested in having the
mistake corrected. None but the state, and Gilpin, had any
kind of concern in the business; and, if a correction could
have been made, the chancellor would certainly have been
bound to take care that Gilpin should not suffer from the
mistake. For instance, suppose the state's proper representative
had, within the year, applied to the chancellor to correct the
mistake, and Gilpin had not had notice thereof, so as to have
his survey made, his certificate examined, and the land
compounded on before the 27th of June 1795; can it be
supposed that the chancellor would not have awarded a patent on a
certificate of survey, made out and compounded on before
the 6th of July following, there being only nine days
difference between the actual and the proper date?¾At the same
time, the chancellor would not have it understood that, in no
case, can a citizen suffer from the misconduct or mistake of an
officer of the state. There is a plain material distinction
between a case like the present, and a case in which a citizen,
to effect his purpose, must procure something to be done
within a limited time. For example¾had Gilpin's warrant been
dated, as it ought to have been, June 26, 1795, and he had
immediately delivered it to the surveyor, from whose neglect,
or mistaking July for June, a certificate was not made out, so
that Gilpin could compound within the year. In such a case,
Gilpin might inevitably have suffered from the misconduct, or
mistake of the officer.
It has been said, very justly, by the caveator's counsel, that
in the present instance, the caveator's case is within the
express provisions of the law. Gilpin's warrant is dated July
|