"14 Nov. 1788—12 Nov. 1791" 149

will decide whether our Legislature have any authority to superinduce the qualification of
District residence; and of consequence whether that part of the Act of Assembly which requires
it is not merely void.'

"Here I mean to draw the question into a narrow compass. Mr. Pinkney charges the
Assembly with having by their regulations superadded an article of qualification to those
already required by the Constitution. I deny that the Legislature has done so; and upon this
single point I rest the matter.

"I pass over the ingenious reasoning employed by Mr. Pinkney to prove that the prohibitory
language of the Constitution on the subject of qualifications, implies a permission in favor of
all persons not expressly excluded, to represent their States in the general Government, because
whether his principle be well founded or not, I am willing to concede in the present case,
that all persons not excluded by the express terms of the Constitution are eligible as Representa-
tives and must remain so, until it is altered.

"I shall now quote Mr. Pinkneys language for the purpose of adopting it—'Who may or
may not be chosen (says Mr. P.) is one thing—How they may be chosen by the people,
another: who are qualified to be elected is one consideration. The manner in which an
election shall be held for persons so qualified, a different one.'

'The language of the General Government is obviously this—The people qualified to vote
for State Delegates/shall elect representatives qualified as the Constitution prescribes; but as
to manner in which the choice of qualified Representatives shall be made by qualified voters,
that subject shall be referred to the State Legislatures and Congress.' [p. 236]

'The Convention determine themselves who may choose and zvho may be chosen, but do not
ascertain when, where or how the choice shall be made. They first decide that Representatives
shall be elected by the people. They next point out what descriptions of people may elect; and
lastly who may be elected.'

"Here I cease to quote Mr. Pinkney's expressions because it is here that I cease to agree
with him, but the foregoing distinction I chearfully adopt as the ground of my own argument,
that the Regulations of the State operate upon a Subject expressly committed to its authority,
To wit the when the where and how, but have not touched upon the Subject upon which
the Convention has itself decided—That is to say who or what description of persons may
be elected.

"The two points of enquiry are

1st. Who may or may not be chosen?

2d. How may they be chosen?

"The first of these questions is answered by the Constitution which gives every man a
capacity to be elected, who is 25 years of age, has been seven years a Citizen of the United
States, and who is actually a resident of the State he claims to represent

"The 2nd. Question is not answered by the Constitution; but means are provided for its
receiving an answer in the modes which the States may adopt, or that which the National
Legislature may in the last resort direct. To show that our Law has neither infringed or
touched the Subject not entrusted to State Regulation To wit eligibility or a capacity to be
elected, it seems necessary in the first place to define the nature of this right.

"I take eligibility or a legal capacity to be elected, to be derived to a Citizen from the
circumstance of his agreeing in personal and accidental qualities with a description previously
laid down by competent authority; further I hold it to be a quality not divisible into parts
or degrees and of course not liable to be impaired without being destroyed; for whoever is