Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 292   Enlarge and print image (70K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
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Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 292   Enlarge and print image (70K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
292 TRIAL OF JOHN W. WEBSTER. of the Medical College, and Professor in the College at Cambridge, did, on the 23d day of November last, violently make an assault upon Dr. George Parkman, and then and there did deprive him of life by violent means. This is set forth in four different forms or counts, charging the death in several different modes, to which I shall have occasion to allude hereafter; and so the grand jury conclude, that in these modes, or some one of them, this crime was committed. Homicide, Gentlemen, of which murder is the highest and most crim- inal species, is of various degrees, according to circumstances. In its largest sense, it is a generic term, embracing every mode by which the life of one man is taken by the act of another. It may be lawful or unlawful. It is lawful when done in lawful war upon an enemy in battle; it is lawful when done by an officer in the execution of justice upon a criminal, pursuant to a proper warrant. It may also be justifiable, and of course lawful, in necessary self-defence. But it is not necessary to dwell on these distinctions; it will be sufficient to ask your attention to the two species of criminal homicide, familiarly known as murder and manslaughter. In seeking for the sources of our law upon this subject, it is proper to say, that whilst the statute law of the Commonwealth declares (Rev. Stat. c. 125, § 1), "that every person who commits the crime of murder shall suffer the punishment of death for the same," yet it nowhere defines the crimes of murder or manslaughter, with all their minute and care- fully-considered distinctions and qualifications. For these, we resort to that great repository of rules, principles, and forms, the common law. This we commonly designate as the common law of England; but it might now be properly called the common law of Massachusetts. It was adopted when our ancestors first settled here, by general consent. It was adopted and confirmed by an early act of the Provincial Govern- ment, and was formally confirmed by the provision of the Constitution (ch. 6, art. 6) declaring that all the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved in the Province or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practised on in the courts of law, shall still remain and be in full force until altered or repealed by the legislature. So far, therefore, as the rules and principles of the common law were applicable to the administration of criminal law, and have not been altered and modified by acts of our colonial or provincial government or by the State legislature, they have the same force and effect as laws formally enacted. By the existing law, as adopted and practised on, unlawful homicide is distinguished into murder and manslaughter. Murder, in the sense in which it is now understood, is the killing of any person in the peace of the Commonwealth, with malice aforethought, either express or implied by law. Malice, in this definition, is used in a technical sense, including not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. It is not confined to ill-will towards one or more individual persons, but is intended to denote an action, flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indications of a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent upon mischief. And therefore malice is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another, however sudden. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice; and may be either voluntary, as when the act is committed with a real design and purpose to kill, but through the violence of sudden passion, occasioned by some great provocation, which in tenderness for the frailty of human nature the law considers sufficient to- palliate the criminality of the offence; or involuntary, as when the death of another is caused by some unlawful act, not accompanied by any intention to take life. From thess two definitions it will be at once perceived, that the char- acteristic disi-unction between murder and manslaughter is malice, expresq