Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 291   Enlarge and print image (68K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
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Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 291   Enlarge and print image (68K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
TRIAL OF JOHN W. WEBSTER. 291 on both sides being before you, that we feel unwilling, notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, to postpone the performance of our part of this duty to another day, which must necessarily extend the trial into another week; and, therefore, painful, responsible, and laborious as this duty is, we think, upon some deliberation, that it is best now to proceed to the performance of it, in order that you may proceed to consider of your verdict. For this reason, not because the case is not in the highest degree important and interesting, but on account of its peculiar circumstances, I may be more brief upon some parts of it than I should otherwise be. But it is, after all, mainly a question of fact upon the evidence. The principles of law for which the Court are responsible, and which are applicable to the present case, are few, plain, and simple. I trust I shall be able to state them briefly; and it will be my duty to consider the rules of law by which the case is to be governed, rather than to make any extended examination of the evidence itself. Gentlemen, some appeals have been made to you upon the solemnity and importance of your duties. They are indeed arduous, but still they are necessary; and every citizen in his turn may be liable to be called on for their performance. But from the cautious manner in which the jury were empanelled, through the application of the appeal made to their consciences by the law for the purpose of excluding all undue influences and securing an unbiased judgment, and through the right secured to the accused of making peremptory challenges, your minds must already have been more deeply impressed than they could be by any words of mine, with the tender regard which the law attributes to the invaluable right of human life. We profess to live under a government of laws. By a distribution of those powers, the existence and exercise of which are essential to the well-being of any civil community, the Constitution of this Common- wealth has intrusted to another department of government, the power of making laws defining crimes and prescribing punishments. For that, courts of justice are not responsible. And, whatever may be the views of all or any of us upon the subject of the punishment appropriated to any offence, it is not our duty to consider it here: but it is our duty to carry the law into effect, and to administer it truly and fairly. It is the appropriate province of legislation to make the law; it is the appro- priate province of jurisprudence to expound it and apply it to particular cases. When a person accused of crime is brought before us, we are to consider what the law and evidence are, and whether, in view of both he has rendered himself amenable to public justice; and, if so, to declare it. But there is another division of duties between the Court and jury, which it is proper to notice. Each has its peculiar duty, and each is responsible for that a]one. It is the province of the Court to state clearly the rules of law applicable to the facts and circumstances brought before the jury by the evidence, with the qualifications and limitations which the case may require, to regulate the course of proceeding, to decide what shall or shall not be admitted as legal and competent evidence, and, generally, to regulate the conduct of the trial. But it is for the jury to take such evidence into consideration, to weigh it impartially, to apply their best judgment to the discovery of the truth, and then by their verdict to declare it. This is the province of the jury; and, whilst each department shall keep within its proper boundaries, the law will be administered according to its true theory, and all will be done which seems within the scope of human power, for the detection and punish- ment of the guilty, and for the security and protection of the innocent. With these few preliminary remarks, I will now proceed to consider the present case. This, Gentlemen, is an indictment, charging the prisoner at the bar with the crime of murder. It alleges that Professor .John W. Webster,