|
150' TRIAL OF JOHN W. WEBSTER.
of evidence, because facts cannot lie.' Numerous remarks might be
made on this strange proposition. The first that presents itself, is, that
the moment we talk of anything, as a consequence necessarily follow-
ing from others, all idea of presumptive reasons is at an end. Secondly,
even assuming the truth of the assertion, that facts, or circumstances,
cannot lie, still, so long as witnesses and documents, by which the
existence of these facts is to be established, can, so long will it be
impossible to arrive at infallible conclusions. But, without dwelling on
these considerations, look at the broad proposition-facts cannot lie.
Can they not, indeed? When, in order to effect the ruin of a poor ser-
vant, his box is opened with a false key, and a quantity of goods, stolen
from his master, deposited in it; or, when a man is found dead, with a
bloody weapon lying beside him, which is proved to belong to a person
with whom he had a'quarrel a short time before, and footmarks of that
person are traced near the corpse, but the murder has, in reality, been
committed by a third person, who, owing a spite to both, put on the
shoes and borrowed the weapon of one to kill the other; did not the
circumstances lie-wickedly, cruelly lie? There is reason to fear, that
blind reliance upon the dictum, `that circumstances cannot lie,' has
occasionally exercised a mischievous effect in the administration of
justice."
There are besides, Gentlemen, in a great cause, like the one we are
now trying, moral reasons, why circumstantial evidence may mislead.
There is a well known tendency of the mind, when great crimes are sus-
pected, which leads witnesses especially, and even jurors, to exagger-
ate facts, and to place great reliance upon their own shrewdness. This,
Gentlemen, is so well stated in the same book which I have quoted, that
I will read again from it, as a part of my argument. Speaking on this
subject, Mr. Best says, "There is an anxiety naturally felt for the detec-
tion of crimes, particularly such as are either very heinous, or peculiar
in their circumstances, which often leads witnesses to mistake or
exaggerate facts, and tribunals to draw rash inferences; and there .is
also natural to the human mind a tendency to suppose greater order and
conformity in things than really exist, and a sort of pride or vanity,
in drawing conclusions from an isolated number of facts, which is apt
to deceive the judgment. Accordingly, the true meaning of the expres-
sions, so frequently to be found in our books, that all presumptive
evidence of felony should be warily pressed, and admitted cautiously,"
&c.
So far, with regard to the nature of the Government's evidence. In
this case it consists entirely, solely, of that which is circumstantial:
and, in many instances, the circumstances themselves which are relied
upon, are actually proved, if at all, by other circumstances. Who shall
say, to what extent the sources of error have been multiplied?
Owing to the known tendency of circumstantial evidence to mislead
the mind, owing to the dangers which are thus likely to arise, 'the law
has adopted certain rules, which are to govern and to guide jurors in
considering it. Some of those rules I shall call your attention to, now,
because I consider them pertinent in this connection. There may be
others mentioned hereafter.
The first rule is, that every circumstance, which is relied on, must
in itself be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. I refer for this, may it
please the Court to the first of Starkie's Evidence, p. 442, (5th Am. ed.)
which I will not stop to read.
Every circumstance is a separate issue, in itself. Every circum-
stance is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt; and this, you under-
stand, means, beyond reasonable doubt, when all the evidence is in.
When you come to consider all the evidence in the case, introduced by
each side, upon each point, you are to he satisfied of each individual
circumstance, beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence it follows, necessarily, that if, in a long train of circum-
|
