Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 149   Enlarge and print image (70K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
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Bemis Report of the Webster Trial, 1850 [1897], Image No: 149   Enlarge and print image (70K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
TRIAL OF JOHN W. WEBSTER. 149 and swears, that he saw a man run from the body into a house near by. A second witness swears, that, the house being pointed out to him, he went in, and arrested a man who appeared to be out of breath. A third comes, and says, that he afterwards found blood on the clothes of the prisoner. Take the first witness. He may be mistaken about the man's identity; about the identity of the house; and he may lie; three chances of error. The second may be mistaken in the man whom he arrested; or the house which he thought was pointed out; or he may lie; three more chances of error. And the third may be able to detect blood, or not; he may be mistaken in his statement, that the clothes were those of the prisoner; or he may lie, too. Here are all these accumulated chances of error. And then, when all these facts are proved, correct conclu- sions are to be drawn from them. It may be, that he did commit murder. It may be, that he was an innocent man, who was running that way; it may be that he ran from terror, at seeing the blow struck; it may be, that he was a friend of the deceased, flying for his own life. I put this as a simple case; and you see how great the chances of error are. But when you come to such a case as the one at bar, there is no telling to what extent these chances multiply. It is necessary also to remember, Gentlemen, as I apprehend,-cer- tainly, it is not the least important objection to this kind of evidence,- that we are always drawing incorrect conclusions from it. Hence, mul- titudes of innocent persons, who whave been convicted on circumstantial proofs, have lost their lives, not so much from falsity on the part of witnesses, as from incorrect inferences drawn by jurors. Take that most common of all cases, cited continally: where an uncle and a niece lived together; and the niece, one evening, was heard, crying out, begging him not to kill her. On the next morning, she had disappeared. The uncle, being charged with the deed, and being put to his wits' end, found another girl, to simulate his niece. The deception was found out, and the man was convicted and hanged. But afterwards the niece came back, having only run away. Here were circumstances, laid before conscientious jurors; circumstances proved by conscientious witnesses. But the jurors erred in the conclusion they drew from them. He who is arrested with stolen goods in his possession, has to answer for it. It implies a theft. There is an old, and well-estab- lished case, in illustration of this; where a man, who had stolen a horse, got a countryman to hold him, knowing he was pursued. Presently, a constable came up, and arrested the countryman. Here was a plain case. He was found with the stolen property in his possession, imme- diately after the theft had taken place; and he was hanged for it. The circumstances proved, were true; the inference, only, was false. I am induced to dwell upon this for a moment, because I am per- fectly aware, that it is often affirmed, that circumstantial evidence is necessarily correct; that "circumstances cannot lie,"-with various other sayings, that are totally false; sayings, which probably applied to the circumstances in connection with which they were first used, but which, by being stupidly repeated over and over again, have attained to the dignity of proverbs. The truth is, that circumstances do not,- but the witnesses who undertake to prove them, may-lie, and, the conclusions drawn from circumstances by human judgments may lie. It is idle to suppose that there is any particular virtue in circumstanital evidence. On the contrary, it should be remembered, that it is weak and uncertain. I read, to this point, as a part of my argument, from Mr. Best's work on Presumptions, page 253. Speaking nn this very subject, and in regard to this prevalent idea, that circumstantial evidence is strong, he says: "Juries have been told, from the Bench, even in capital cases, that, `where a violent presumption necessarily arises from circum- stances, they are more convincing and satisfactory than any other kind