BROOKS VS. DELAPLAINE. 353

to them may seem proper, for the vindication of their rights.
If they have reason to think that the decree of the court, of
February, 1847, was obtained by collusion, and fraudulently, the
remedy for such fraud is open to them there. Or, if the terms
of the decree are such as to leave open the questions they de-
sire now to litigate, the court which passed the decree is surely
the proper tribunal for the adjudication of those questions.

This court has no means of knowing, nor is it important it
should know, what further proceedings have been had in Fred-
erick County Court, since the decree of February, 1847.

It is enough that it is duly informed, that such a decree was
passed upon a bill filed there, before the exhibition of the bill
in this court.

That decree, it is presumed, is in a course of execution, and
if this court is to proceed upon the bill filed here, it is indisput-
ably necessary that the cause in Frederick should stop; as
otherwise it may happen, and indeed the result can scarcely be
avoided, that inconsistent and conflicting decrees will be pass-
ed with reference to the same subject matters. But what
power has this court to arrest the proceedings of Frederick
County Court ? The county courts by the express terms of the
act of 1815, chapter 163, section 1, are clothed with all and
singular the powers, authorities and jurisdictions that can or
may be exercised by the Chancellor of this state, whether the
same be derived from the common law, or in virtue of any stat-
ute or act of assembly heretofore passed. These county courts
are, to all intents and purposes, co-ordinate courts with this,
exercising concurrent jurisdiction within their respective or-
bits—the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court being co-extensive
with the limits of the state, that of the county courts depending
upon the locality of the property, or upon the residence of the
defendants. But the powers of the county courts within the
boundaries assigned them, are equal in every respect to the
powers of this court; the appeal from all being to the Court of
Appeals.

There is no instance, as remarked by the late Chancellor in
Brown vs. Wallace I G. & J., 497, in which either one of the ,
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