to them may seem proper, for the vindication of their rights. If they have reason to think that the decree of the court, of February, 1847, was obtained by collusion, and fraudulently, the remedy for such fraud is open to them there. Or, if the terms of the decree are such as to leave open the questions they desire now to litigate, the court which passed the decree is surely the proper tribunal for the adjudication of those questions.

This court has no means of knowing, nor is it important it should know, what further proceedings have been had in Frederick County Court, since the decree of February, 1847.

It is enough that it is duly informed, that such a decree was passed upon a bill filed there, before the exhibition of the bill in this court.

That decree, it is presumed, is in a course of execution, and if this court is to proceed upon the bill filed here, it is indisputably necessary that the cause in Frederick should stop; as otherwise it may happen, and indeed the result can scarcely be avoided, that inconsistent and conflicting decrees will be passed with reference to the same subject matters. But what power has this court to arrest the proceedings of Frederick County Court? The county courts by the express terms of the act of 1815, chapter 163, section 1, are clothed with all and singular the powers, authorities and jurisdictions that can or may be exercised by the Chancellor of this state, whether the same be derived from the common law, or in virtue of any statute or act of assembly heretofore passed. These county courts are, to all intents and purposes, co-ordinate courts with this, exercising concurrent jurisdiction within their respective orbits—the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court being co-extensive with the limits of the state, that of the county courts depending upon the locality of the property, or upon the residence of the defendants. But the powers of the county courts within the boundaries assigned them, are equal in every respect to the powers of this court; the appeal from all being to the Court of Appeals.

There is no instance, as remarked by the late Chancellor in *Brown* vs. *Wallace*, 1 *G. & J.*, 497, in which either one of the