

fabricated conformably to the several and respective standards required by law. This regulation keeps the manufacture up to its standard, prevents the frauds of manufacturers, and imposition on the purchasers. The manufactures of France and England have been improved by this regulation, and probably to this they may owe, in a great degree, the perfection to which most of them have been brought.

It must be admitted, that the regulation proposed by the bill, if properly executed, will induce the planters to sort their tobacco, and to pack each sort, as much as possible, in separate casks; this practice, by facilitating, will promote the purchase of tobacco; different sorts of this plant suit different markets; the purchaser, by a bare inspection of the inspector's books, at any warehouse, will discover the several species of tobacco there inspected, and he will thereby be enabled to judge, without the expence and trouble of a reinspection under his own eye, whether he can suit himself with the particular species and quality of tobacco, wanted at the market for which he may be commissioned to buy.

New regulations, however beneficial, are apt at first to excite murmurs and discontents; old habits and prejudices are not to be surmounted at once. Some of you may remember the opposition given to the first inspection law; yet the continuance of that law has certainly improved the staple of tobacco, and a better regulation will as assuredly tend to a further improvement of it. The objections to and clamour against the inspection of flour, and distinguishing its qualities in this and other states, must be remembered, and the very advantageous consequences of these regulations are now felt, and generally admitted. The perfection of every article and manufacture is only attainable by degrees; time and experience suggest improvements, which good policy, in spite of prejudice and habit, usually adopts, sooner or later; but the later these improvements are adopted, the greater will be the loss to the community. To prevent injustice to individuals, and to give the people an opportunity of preparing for the adoption of the system of this bill, were the inducements to delay its operation until September seventeen hundred and eighty-seven, and this delay, in our opinion, removed every objection to it.

We think the regulation contained in the bill will, in a few years, greatly improve one of our most valuable staple commodities. We have pointed out the grounds of this opinion; if it be lightly taken up, and erroneous, we wish to be undeceived, that we may at length agree upon a bill which has employed so much of the time and attention of the legislature. As a further inducement to wave your amendment, we take the liberty to remark, that the conferees have adhered to the spirit of the system laid down in this part of the bill, as it was originated by your house; the provisions for carrying that system into execution, were indeed defective; in perfecting those provisions, to secure the full and entire effects of the projected system, the conferees, as we conceive, have acted in strict conformity to your original design and views, and we are now at a loss to divine what objections have of late occurred to alter your former sentiments; for having agreed upon the principle or system, we cannot suppose that an imperfect mode, as to the execution, was designedly pursued, to counteract or defeat the plan or system.

Although one branch of the legislature is not obliged to assign the reasons which induced it to put a negative on a bill originated by the other, and were reasons always to be assigned for every negative, great delays might be occasioned by such a practice, yet there are some bills, the principles of which appear so obviously expedient and just, that the rejection of them, when the reasons are not disclosed, will give room to various conjectures, and perhaps to improper suspicions. In such instances, the reasons of the negative should be imparted to the other branch, not only to remove the suspicion that no good arguments can be adduced, but that by the adducing of such, the house which originated the bill, or the public, may be satisfied of its impropriety or bad tendency. In the number of the bills described, we may safely rank the bill to prevent frivolous appeals, and the bill to ascertain what shall be recovered on protested bills of exchange; the former might not be rightly understood. That bill does not take away the right of appeal where there may be good cause; it only tends to correct a rapidly increasing evil, by compelling the party appealing without just cause, (of which the court appealed to is to judge,) to make compensation to the party aggrieved by the delay. The unnecessary delays of the law, which frivolous appeals have much increased of late, are justly considered as a very great grievance. A bill has been offered to your house to restrain the abuse, and to proportion the damages to the injury sustained. Why has this bill been rejected? Are the damages imposed upon the person who has dragged his adversary through all the labyrinths and tedious forms of law from court to court, merely to procrastinate the payment of a just claim, in your estimation too large? Is it just that the creditor should, when reluctantly forced to have recourse to law, be kept out of his money for several years by frivolous and vexatious appeals, calculated solely for the purpose of delay, without receiving any satisfaction for the disappointment, and heavy loss incurred?

In many cases the plaintiff recovers no interest at all upon his claim fixed by judgment in the inferior court, after a delay of three or four years by appeal, and can it be said, even in those cases where legal interest may be recovered, that it is a sufficient compensation for the delay and expence attending the appeal? This, we believe, will scarcely be asserted, for the experience of every man in business would contradict the assertion. If then to compensate the creditor, who has been injured by an unreasonable delay, be just, the only question which can arise, must relate solely to the quantum of the compensation to be made to him. To admit that the party aggrieved should be compensated, and yet to contend, that this is not the time to grant or permit such compensation, is saying that justice may be justly excluded from certain counties at