

<i>Kent, Ditto,</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	243	8	1
<i>Cecil, Ditto,</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	189	4	7
<i>Baltimore, Ditto,</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	605	11	1
<i>Anne Arundel, Ditto,</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	432	9	1
<i>Calvert, Ditto,</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	115	15	4
Several Lands have been discovered in the three last Counties which are not yet carried to the Rent-Rolls, so as to distinguish what Part lies in each County, whereof the whole									74	0	6
Rent amounts to <i>per Annum, Ditto,</i>											
<i>Prince George's County, Ditto,</i>									803	6	1
<i>Charles County, Ditto,</i>									263	8	6
<i>St. Mary's County, Ditto,</i>									169	9	0
									4568	15	4

The whole Sum which the People now pay amounts to — — — — — 5369 11 3  
 The Sheriffs will collect this for 5 *per Cent.* which is — — — — — 208 9 1

His Lordship will then receive nett, — — — — — 5101 2 2  
 Besides Arrears, Certificates not carried to the Rent-Rolls, those in the Hands of the Surveyors, Warrants located, and future Increase.

*The House adjourns to 2 of the Clock.  
 Post Meridieum.*

The House met according to Adjournment.

The House taking into Consideration the Governor's Message of Saturday, concerning Fines, Forfeitures, &c. *Ordered,* That the Committee of Laws prepare an Address in Answer thereto.

The following Ingrossed Address, *viz.*

*To his Excellency THOMAS BLADEN, Esq; Governor of Maryland;*  
 The Humble ADDRESS of the House of DELEGATES of the said Province.

*May it please your Excellency,*

**A**LTHO' we were greatly concerned on reading the Introduction to your last Message, relating to the Pound of Tobacco *p. r* Taxable, intimating that your Excellency's Opinion differed from that of this House upon the Right of Levying the same; and the more so, as we had previous to Our last Address to your Excellency on that Head, given it the fullest Attention and Consideration we were capable of; yet from the subsequent Parts of that Message we have great Hopes, that when you shall have considered the several Laws, which are the Subject Matter of this Controversy between us, with the same Attention that we have done, you will not think us wrong in our Opinion.

We believe with your Excellency, that (in general) the difference between a perpetual and temporary Law is. "That there is no time limited for the Duration, Operation, or Continuance, of the former, and that therefore it must continue in force till it is repealed: That the latter having a fix'd or limited Time for its Duration, or Operation, it must certainly expire, when the Time so fixed or limited expires, or the End for which it was made, is fully answered, unless it is continued by another Law." But we cannot see how this Distinction can any way serve your Excellency's Purpose; for if the former Part of that Distinction be applyed to the Law of 1715, that is evidently no such Law as must continue in force until it be repealed; and there is in the Body of it according to your own Admission, a Time limited for its Duration, which makes it but a Temporary Law, expressly according to the latter Part of that Distinction: Nor can we apprehend how that Distinction can avail your Excellency, so as to make the Law of 1722 a perpetual Law for want of a Limitation given either to it, or in it, to the Law of 1715, and from whence we suppose it may be endeavour'd to be infer'd, that the Law of 1715 is thereby made perpetual; for however true in general that Distinction may be, yet we must humbly contend the present Case is not within it as to your Excellency's purpose, because altho' in the Enacting a Law in the first Instance, it must necessarily be supposed from the not giving it a Limitation, to be the Intention of the Legislature that it should be perpetual, unless it be in its Nature made but for a temporary Purpose; yet we apprehend there is no Room for the like Supposition in the present Dispute: The Law of 1715 is by a Clause in the Body of it Temporary only, this being near expiring, is by a Law in 1722 (for we need not perplex this Question by taking Notice of the intermediate reviving Law of 1719) revived and continued in full Force, without expressing any Term of Continuance either for the Law of 1715, or for that reviving Law of 1722; the Case being thus circumstanced, if there be no Necessity to suppose it the Intention of the Legislature that the Law of 1715 should, by that of 1722 be made perpetual, this Case is then clearly without that Distinction as to your Purpose, and cannot therefore be affected by it; and that Law may, notwithstanding any Circumstances in this Case, have been but temporary and long since expired; and to that Purpose, when that Law in 1715 was revived by that in 1722, the Clause of Limitation in the former was likewise revived with the rest of that Law, and has as much Force and Effect as any other Part of it, and may consequently be taken as a new Term for it's Duration, at the End of which it has expired, for want of another Law to revive and continue it afterwards; and we think this temporary Revival of the former Law, is not only a sufficient reason for the Legislature's making that Reviving Law in 1722, but will also satisfy and give Effect and Meaning to the Words "Revived and continued in full Force" and will consequently remove that necessary Supposition of an intended Perpetuity before mentioned; and then this last Law, having fully "Answered the End for which it was made" by giving the former Law a further Duration for Three Years, is we think according to your Excellency's Distinction, and wherein you admit that a Law having no particular Limitation may yet be temporary, certainly expired; and by this Construction every Part of those Laws in 1715 and 1722 are consistent with and reconcilable to each other; whereas by the Construction contended for by your Excellency,