

importance to the public by Saturday next, and if we succeed, will close the session at that day. We propose to adjourn to the first Monday in May next.

By order,

W. HARWOOD, clk.

Which was read.

Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, Esq; not having complied with the rule of the senate, in bringing in his protest in five days, on application, was indulged with leave; whereupon he brings in and delivers to the president the following:

Dissentiet.

BECAUSE this bill puts the management and sale of the specific articles payable in discharge of a large proportion of the tax, under the direction of the governor and council, a board, which from its constitution, and the variety of business it has to transact, is not so competent as one person, to a judicious and economical administration of a complicated revenue.

BECAUSE the incompetency of the governor and council is not merely presumed, but founded on experience; since the past mismanagement of the specifics, and the waste of them, induced the legislature to commit the charge and sale thereof to the direction of one man, and occasioned the appointment of an intendant of the revenue, from which the state has already reaped considerable advantages, and from whose continuance in office it would probably derive still greater.

BECAUSE it were better to leave the specifics in the hands of the people than to draw them out in payment of unprofitable taxes, and store them at places, in which, to judge from the past, they will probably be left to waste, rot, and be embezzled.

BECAUSE the clause enabling debtors to retain in their hands one sixth of the interest accruing on monies loaned, is retrospective, infringing prior contracts, creditors not having it in their option, under the present system of law, to call in the principal, in order to avoid this reduction of interest.

BECAUSE the principle, on which this clause in the bill is presumed to be grounded, is too fanciful and ideal, inapplicable to most cases, and improperly applied to all. The principle goes upon this supposition, that every debtor has realised the money borrowed, out of which one sixth of the interest may be discounted, in visible taxable property, and that the sum payable on his assessment, may equal, exceed, or be less than one sixth of the interest discounted; if equal, the creditor in fact, and not the person assessed, pays the tax. To all cases (and a variety of such may exist) in which the sum payable by the debtor on his assessed property is less than one sixth of the interest retained, the principle is totally inapplicable; for in such cases, the debtors may retain more, by withholding a sixth of the accrued interest, than what they pay in their assessments, and then the creditors not only pay the assessments of debtors, but the latter gain from the former the difference between the sums paid and the excess. Admitting the monies borrowed, bearing interest, to be invested in real, visible, and taxable property, and the sum paid by the debtor, on the valuation of his property, to exceed a sixth of the interest withheld from his creditor, still is the principle improperly applied by the clause dissented to. If properly applied, all property must be assessed at its *real* value; for instance, a certain portion of land, valued at one hundred pounds, ought not to be worth in reality more than that sum; for it is evident, unless lands, and other visible taxable property, are justly valued, the reduction of a sixth of the interest must be unjust, being made from a definite portion of property, viz. one hundred and six pounds, a property not ascertained, as most others by the discretionary and fallible judgment of an assessor, and daily decreasing in value, while that of lands hath risen of late years considerably, and by many is supposed still to be rising. Thus, in virtue of the clause objected to, a piece of land valued at one hundred pounds, but really worth two hundred, will pay only twenty-five shillings, and the owner, who may have borrowed one hundred pounds, is empowered to deduct twenty-shillings from one hundred and six pounds.

BECAUSE this clause is a tack to a money-bill, not immediately relating to, and necessary for, the imposing, assessing, levying, or applying the taxes to be raised for the current expences of the year, but contains matter totally distinct from the nature and essence of a money-bill, as defined by the form of government, viz. an impolitic reduction of interest from six to five per cent. which if continued, will operate as a discouragement to private and public credit, and force the monied men to draw their capitals out of the hands of the citizens of this state to place them in other countries, in which they will not be subjected to such reductions.

BECAUSE the menacing, yet ridiculous and illegal provision in the latter part of the clause, will operate only on the timid and ignorant, and is in reality an acknowledgment of its impropriety, and discovers the strongest apprehension, that what is unjust, and indeed absurd, will be disregarded by the more-informed.

CHARLES CARROLL, of Carrollton.

The engrossed bills from No. 1 to 6 inclusive, were read, assented to, and the paper bills thereof, so endorsed, sent to the house of delegates by Richard Barnes, Esq;

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